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I. MATERIALITY AND RELEVANCY
A. Materiality
Materiality looks to the relation between the propositions for
which the evidence is offered and the issues in the case. If the
evidence is offered to prove a proposition which is not a matter in
issue, the evidence is properly said to be immaterial.'
1. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 185 (2d ed. 1972).
EVIDENCE
In Saviano v. State, I the defendant, charged with sale of narcot-
ics, raised the defense of entrapment. He sought to introduce evi-
dence showing the extent of the connection between the buyer of the
narcotics and the police. Such evidence was deemed material to the
defense in issue.3
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Zufelt4 involved a car-train
collision. The issue submitted to the jury was whether negligence on
the part of the railroad was a contributing cause of the accident. The
defendant sought, unsuccessfully, to introduce evidence of the level
of the alchohol in the blood of the driver of the car. On appeal, the
District Court of Appeal, First District, indicated that given the
limited nature of the issue, introduction of the evidence "could have
had no effect other than to open the minds of the jurors, to improper
speculative excursions outside the issues developed by the plead-
ings."'
It has also been pointed out that where liability, but not
damages, is of issue, evidence of the plaintiff having received social
security and workmen's compensation benefits is not material.'
B. Relevancy
1. GENERALLY
Relevancy is the tendency of evidence to establish a material
proposition. Evidence is relevant if it has some probative value
concerning the issue in question.
Clark v. Grimsley7 involved a contested will, wherein it was
alleged that the sole devisee had exerted undue influence upon the
testatrix. It was held that letters written by the testatrix to the
devisee, during a 2 year span immediately prior to the execution of
the will, were relevant to the allegation of undue influence since
they presented a continuous pattern of the testatrix's state of mind.
In Walton v. Robert E. Haas Construction Corp.8 the plaintiffs
alleged that they became involved in an automobile accident as a
2. 287 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
3. However, since the case was reversed on other grounds, this recognition was purely
dictum.
4. 280 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
5. Id. at 725.
6. Cook v. Eney, 277 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
7. 270 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
8. 259 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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result of the defendant's failure to properly place warning devices
around a portion of street upon which it was working. The plaintiffs
attempted to offer evidence that no barricades existed around the
site some hours after the close of work nor prior to the time of the
accident. The trial court excluded this evidence, reasoning that the
crucial question was whether the defendant erected the barricades
at the close of work; since some third person could have removed
the barricades later, their existence at that later time was irrele-
vant. However, on appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Third
District, held that the absence of barricades some hours after the
close of work had some probative value of their existence earlier and
was therefore relevant.
In 1949 the Supreme Court of Florida, in Barton v. Miami
Transit Co.,' held that when liability was admitted in a collision
case, and only damage to the plaintiff was in issue, the trial judge
could exclude evidence of the physical conditions surrounding the
accident, going to the question of liability, in the interest of expedit-
ing the proceeding. In Traud v. Waller,0 a collision case, the defen-
dant admitted liability but contested damages. The plaintiff sought
to introduce photographs of the collision to substantiate the dam-
ages claimed. However, the trial court, apparently relying on Barton
and believing the photos were merely overkill on the issue of liabil-
ity, excluded the evidence. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal,
Third District, pointed out that the Barton decision acknowledged
that in some instances, even where liability is admitted, a plaintiff
should be allowed to show some phase of the collision to prove
damages. Finding this to be such a case, the court noted that the
proffered evidence was probative of the damage issue and as such,
relevant.
Once evidence is found to be relevant, before it can be deemed
admissible, its probative value must outweigh any grounds for not
hearing the evidence (i.e. confusion, surprise, time, or prejudice).
For example, in Cook v. Eney," a personal injury action, the de-
fendant introduced evidence that the plaintiff had received social
security and workmen's compensation benefits, on the premise of
rebutting the plaintiff's testimony regarding his motivation to
9. 42 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 1949).
10. 272 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
11. 277 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
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work.'2 The District Court of Appeal, Third District, believed, how-
ever, that the potential prejudice to the plaintiff (i.e., the jury be-
lieving the plaintiff was seeking a double recovery) outweighed the
probative value of the evidence on the issue of malingering.
In Wilson v. State,"3 the balance of relevancy and prejudice
went the other way. The defendant was charged with murder. The
record showed that a man of the defendant's blood type had sex with
one of the victims prior to her death. Pornographic material which
was found in the defendant's home and automobile was introduced
at trial. The defense claimed this evidence was both irrelevant and
prejudicial. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida not only found
the evidence relevant, but that the relevancy outweighed its poten-
tial prejudice.
2. SIMILAR OCCURRENCES
A problem involving both relevancy and its counterweights is
raised when a party attempts to prove that certain actions or
conditions occurred by showing that similar actions or conditions
occurred before or since. Frequently this problem arises in accident
cases.
In Perret v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad,'4 a personal injury
action based on a car-train collision, the plaintiff sought to intro-
duce evidence of a similar collision which occurred in the same
location 2 weeks prior to his accident. The ostensible purpose of
such evidence was to show the existence of a dangerous condition
of which the defendant had knowledge. The court acknowledged
that such evidence might have some probative value, but also dis-
cussed the potential misuse of the evidence which might create a
time consuming and prejudicial collateral issue. Reviewing Florida
law and cases from other states, the supreme court pointed out that
admissibility will turn on the degree of similarity and closeness in
time of the events sought to be associated. In the instant case, the
evidence was admitted since both accidents involved vehicles trav-
elling in the same direction, at the same crossing, at about the same
time of day, under similar weather conditions, and the accidents
took place only 2 weeks apart.
12. There is some doubt whether the "motivation" question was a material issue.
13. 306 So. 2d 513 (Fla. 1975).
14. 299 So. 2d 590 (Fla. 1974).
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In Friddle v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad"5 the Supreme
Court of Florida, by referring to a well written dissent below, fur-
ther elaborated upon its "similar occurrence" doctrine. Taking
both opinions together, it appears that so long as there is "substan-
tial similarity" between events, the similar occurrence evidence
should be allowed, with the degree of similarity going toward the
weight and not admissibility of the evidence. It was also pointed
out that the similar occurrence may take place either prior or subse-
quent to the litigated occurrence. Finally, there is indication"8 that
the necessity for showing substantial similarity is considerably re-
laxed where the evidence is offered not to show negligence, but to
show the defendant's notice of a dangerous condition.
A concept analogous to the similar occurrence doctrine is in-
volved in valuation of condemned property. Florida law allows as
relevant proof of value at the time of condemnation, the price paid
for the property by the condemnee, so long as the original purchase
price was not too remote in time and other evidence establishes that
-the value of the property has not significantly changed. In Nour v.
Division of Administration,7 introduction of the purchase price by
the state, over defendant's objection, was held reversible error where
the purchase had occurred 15 years prior to the condemnation, there
had been a transition in use of the property, and the condemnee had
expended substantial sums on improvements.
The Nour holding was followed in Whidden v. Division of
Administration, ,8 where, on cross examination of the owner, the
State inquired into the sum he had paid for the property 8 years
prior to the taking. The court held the questioning improper not
only because of the lapse of time, but because of the volatile econ-
omy and inflationary trends experienced in recent years, of which
the court took judicial notice."9
Value of condemned property may also be established through
proof of prices paid for similar property. Although the other prop-
erty must be similar to that being condemned, it need not be in the
15. 306 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1974).
16. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Friddle, 290 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
17. 267 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
18. 281 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
19. See Section VIII, B, infra.
[Vol. 30:561
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same vicinity or even in the same county."0 Note that this rule does
require that the price have actually been paid; mere offers or asking
prices are inadmissible.
3. POLYGRAPH TESTS AND VOICEPRINTS
Results of certain scientific tests may be the subject of
relevancy attacks if there is doubt that they are in fact probative
and if they may also cause undue prejudice, delay, surprise, or
confusion. In a 1953 Florida decision22 the probative worth of lie
detector results was placed in doubt. That decision was widely
cited 3 during the current survey period to exclude polygraph results
from evidence, although there is some authority recognizing the
advances which have been made in improving the accuracy of such
tests." However, if both parties stipulate to its admissibility, a poly-
graph result may be admitted into evidence. 5 In two recent deci-
sions 6 the Third and Fourth Districts have held spectrographic
analysis of recorded conversations (commonly called "voiceprints")
admissible to prove the identity of the speaker. However, in both
cases there was corroborating evidence establishing identity. The
question of whether uncorroborated voice prints would be admissi-
ble was expressly left open. There appears to be no justification for
this extra requirement since the existence of corroborative evidence
should be a factor going only to weight and not to admissibility.
II. EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
A. Adverse Witnesses
An examining attorney may, on direct examination, interrogate
any "unwilling or hostile" witness by leading questions. 27 The exam-
20. Clairborne v. City of Jacksonville, 260 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
21. Orlando-Orange County Express Authority v. Diversified Serv., Inc., 283 So. 2d 876
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1973); Rice v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 281 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
22. Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2d 339 (Fla. 1953).
23. E.g., Sullivan v. State 303 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1974); State v. Curtis, 281 So. 2d 514 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1973), cert. denied 290 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1974).
24. United States v. Urguidez, 356 F. Supp. 1363 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
25. Moore v. State, 299 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Askary v. State, 294 So. 2d 33
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
26. Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972) and Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613
(Fla. 4th Dist. 1972); cf. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
27. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.450(a).
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iner may not, however, impeach his own witness unless the court
determines that the witness is adverse.,8
The basis for impeaching an adverse party witness is governed
by Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.450(a) which allows a party to
an action to call an adverse party as a witness and to interrogate
and impeach him "in all respects as if he had been called by the
adverse party."
The same rule allows a similar interrogation of any "officer,
director, or managing agent of a public or private corporation or of
a partnership or association which is an adverse party." In corpora-
tion cases, the determination of whether the called witnes is adverse
depends on the witness' affiliation with the adverse party on the
date of the trial.29 The trial judge may exercise discretion in deciding
whether to allow the adverse witness to be called." "Managing
agent" has been construed to include a retired union official who
although "not associated with the [defendant] union at the time
of the trial . . . was apparently the designated representative of the
union at the time of the trial.""1 Yet, a trial court was not found to
have abused its discretion for refusing to allow a party "to call as
an adverse witness a former salesman not then employed by or
connected with the [plaintiff corporation] at the time of the
trial."32
The impeachment of an adverse non-party witness is governed
by the Florida Statutes. Upon a showing that the witness' testimony
is prejudiced or adverse, the witness may be impeached by other
evidence or a showing of a prior inconsistent statement. 31 Impeach-
ment may not, however, be shown by general evidence of bad char-
acter.3
4
Whether the witness is a party or non-party, he is considered
adverse when his testimony surprises or entraps the party calling
28. FLA. STAT. § 90.09 (1973).
29. Direct Transp. Co. v. Rakaskas, 167 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964), cert. discharged,
176 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1965).
30. Pitz v. Tempco Air-Conditioning, Inc., 268 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
31. Farmer v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 258 So. 2d 503, 504 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
The opinion fails to explain how the agent could be a "designated-representative" and yet
be "not associated" with the union. Presumably the court intended a distinction between
formal and informal representation.
32. Pitz v. Tempco Air-Conditioning, Inc., 268 So. 2d 556, 557 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
33. Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. Cutler, 212 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1968).
34. FLA. STAT. § 90.09 (1973).
[Vol. 30:561
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him." Surprise or entrapment, moreover, must be clearly demon-
strated. "[T]estimony is deemed a surprise if it is not that which
the party expected and is detrimental to his cause."3 It is not
enough for the examining party merely to assert he did not know
what the witness was going to say.37
B. Cross-Examination
1. GENERALLY
The right of cross-examination is implicit in the constitutional
right of confrontation and it helps to assure truthful testimony.'
The right to cross-examination has been extended to most adversary
proceedings, including bail reduction hearings. 31
Two cases during the survey period involved a question of
whether the right to cross-examine a witness was denied where prior
testimony had been preserved for trial. In Hutchins v. State" the
District Court of Appeal, Third District, affirmed a conviction
based on videotape testimony. Defense counsel, present at the tap-
ing of the testimony of a lab technician, had an opportunity to
examine the witness. Duplicate copies of the video tape were made
and one was furnished to the defendant. The witness was unavaila-
ble at the trial. The tape was admitted over the objection of the
defendant that he was deprived of the right of confrontation at trial.
Although the prosection failed. to transcribe the taped testimony
and furnish defendant with a copy pursuant to established rules of
procedure,4 the court found no harmful error. The court held that
35. Thomas v. State, 289 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
36. Id. at 420-21 (emphasis in original).
37. Florida courts should be wary about applying a restrictive view on the adverseness
of a witness in light of the recent Supreme Court decision of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284 (1973), which held that state law interference with a defendant's right to defend
himself against an adverse witness may be violative of due process.
38. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
39. Stansel v. State, 297 So.2d 63 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
40. 286 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
41. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190 () provides that the taking and preserving
of testimony in criminal proceedings shall be in accordance with the rules of civil procedure.
The court cited Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.310 as stating that preserved "testimony
shall be recorded verbatim stenographically or by mechanical means and transcribed unless
the parties agree otherwise" (emphasis added). By amendment effective January 1, 1973
(during the pendancy of the appeal), however, the rule was changed to require transcription
of the testimony only upon the request of one of the parties.
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since a written transcript of the deposition would be admissible, the
admission of video tape is either admissible or no more than harm-
less error.
In the second case, State v. Barnes,4" an alibi witness' pre-trial
statement was preserved by a court reporter, the witness having
died before the trial. The State did not have notice that the testi-
mony was being taken and had no opportunity to be present and
cross-examine the witness. The trial judge ordered the witness'
statement into evidence. On appeal by the State, the District Court
of Appeal, Second District, held that there had been no procedural
deviation from the essential requirements of law. Statements made
under oath should be admissible under proper protections estab-
lished by the trial judge. The court pointed out that the State does
not have the same right of confrontation as a criminal defendant.
The court also noted that proper protections could be provided by
the judge's instruction to the jury "as to the weight they may place
upon the statement" and by the State's opportunity to impeach the
witness statement through other witnesses.
2. scoPE
In Florida, the permissible scope of cross-examination "extends
to the entire subject matter of direct examination 'and to all matters
that may modify, supplement, contradict, rebut, or make clearer
the facts testified to in chief. . .. ' 43
In C.A. W v. State,'44 the State's first witness, an alleged rob-
bery victim, on direct examination described the robbery in detail,
identified the defendant as one of the robbers, and further stated
that she saw the robbers after the crime. On cross-examination, the
defense sought to question her as to when she saw them and under
what circumstances, but was denied this opportunity when the
State objected to the questions as being beyond the scope of what
was asked on direct. On cross-examination of another state witness
(the arresting officer), defense counsel again asked how the defen-
dant had been identified and what had occurred after the arrest.
Objection by the State again was sustained by the trial court on the
42. 280 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
43. Cocoa v. State, 62 So. 2d 892, 895 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 931 (1954),
rehearing denied, 350 U.S. 855 (1955).
44. 295 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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sole ground that the questions were beyond the scope of direct ex-
amination. Reversing these rulings on appeal, the District Court of
Appeal, First District, held that
[q]uestions which are reasonably relevant to questions pro-
pounded on direct examination or answers elicited (or even vol-
unteered) are not objectionable on the ground of being beyond the
scope of direct examination. 5
Here, since the subject matter of the questions "related to the iden-
tification of the defendant by the victim, the place of identification,
and the manner thereof," exclusion of such relevant and material
evidence was prejudicial to the defense.46
When a witness testifies to facts relating to an occurrence in his
presence, he may be questioned, on cross-examination, as to all the
facts connected with the matters already stated. This general rule
was applied in Elmore v. State,7 a murder prosecution, where, on
direct examination of an eye witness to the altercation, the State's
interrogation of the witness "abruptly ceased" at the point of her
describing the first shots. Defense counsel sought to cross-examine
the witness on her observations of the quarrel past that point, but
the trial court sustained the State's objection. The District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, found a denial of defendant's right to
fully cross-examine the witness, indicating, "The state's attorney
. . . [can] not limit investigation into the entire transaction by
asking the witness about only a part of the difficulty. .. ."
The question of full and fair cross-examination arose again in
Lely Estates, Inc. v. Polly,49 a civil action for breach of an oral
employment contract. As to certain checks already in the em-
ployee's possession, the plaintiff employee contended that these
payments were drawn against his salesman's commission, whereas
the defendant employer claimed that these amounts were loans to
the plaintiff. To determine the purpose of the payments, defense
counsel, during cross-examination of the plaintiff, attempted to in-
quire into whether these amounts had been reported as income on
45. Id. at 330.
46. See also Settle v. State, 288 So. 2d 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
47. 291 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974), citing Savage & James v. State, 18 Fla. 909
(1882).
48. Id. at 620, quoting Haager v. State, 83 Fla. 41, 49, 90 So. 812, 815 (1922).
49. 308 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
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the plaintiff's income tax return. Upon objection, the trial court
refused to allow this inquiry on cross-examination. The District
Court of Appeal, Second District, found the trial court's refusal to
permit this cross-examination to be reversible error since the report-
ing of these payments was crucial in determining whether the
checks were a loan or a commission.
To achieve full and fair cross-examination of a witness, the
defense should be afforded an opportunity to see and examine
during cross-examination any memoranda used by a State witness
in aid of his testimony." This principle was applied in Soler v.
Kukula, a civil action arising out of an automobile accident where
an investigating officer was called by the plaintiff as a witness and
allowed to testify from his personal notes and records of the acci-
dent." The trial court denied the defendant access to these notes on
the ground that they were covered by the confidentiality privilege
under Florida Statues section 316.066 (1973). The District Court of
Appeal, Third District, reversed, holding that the plaintiff had
waived the protection granted such accident reports by the statute
and that the defendant's right to cross-examine the officer required
access to the notes.
A decision apparently inconsistent with Soler was reached in
Clements v. State,5" a per curiam affirmance, without opinion, of a
robbery conviction and life sentence. At the direction of the prose-
cuting attorney, one of the officers (Davis) read "minute and de-
tailed descriptions" of the robbers from a report prepared by officer
Arcuni, who was the first officer on the scene of the crime. Officer
Arcuni's report was purportedly a composite of descriptions given
him by eye witnesses. Officer Davis had not been at the crime scene
to hear these statements and officer Arcuni did not testify at trial.
The defendant sought to examine the report as a preface to his
cross-examination of officer Davis. The State's objection to the de-
fendant's access to the report was sustained by the trial court and
affirmed by the majority on appeal. However, Judge Walden noted
in his dissenting opinion that in
[e]liminating hearsay features which were not placed in issue,
it is of manifest importance that such examination be permitted.
50. Minturn v. State, 136 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1962).
51. 297 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
52. 283 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
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It allows the defense to determine if the material was read with
fidelity and if it was in context, among other things. It allows a
determination as to whether there were critical omissions or dis-
qualifications."3
Furthermore, Judge Walden correctly recognized that it is re-
versible error to refuse the defense the right to inspect material used
by a witness to refresh his memory even where the witness himself
prepared the writing. Since in the instant case the memoranda had
been prepared by someone other than the witness, an even more
fundamental right of cross-examination had been foreclosed.
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.250 provides that a defen-
dant offering no testimony in his own behalf, except his own, shall
be entitled to the concluding argument before the jury. In Walters
v. State,"4 during cross-examination of a State witness, the marking
of an article for identification by the defense was held not to consti-
tute introduction of the article into evidence. Thus, the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, found reversible error in the trial
court granting the State, over the defendant's objection, the right
to opening and closing argument to the jury.
C. Redirect Examination
The general function of redirect examination is to reply to new
matters drawn out on cross-examination. Thus, testimony elicited
on cross-examination may open the door to new inquiries on re-
direct. However, the inquiry on redirect is limited strictly to the
testimony given on cross-examination. In Spears v. State,5 the
court found that the testimony elicited during the defense's cross-
examination of an investigating officer as to statements made by
one companion of the defendant at the time of the charged offense
did not "open the door" for the State, on redirect, to elicit testimony
concerning a statement, directly implicating the defendant, made
to the officer by another companion.
Redirect may also permit the admission of testimony not other-
wise admissible. In National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Holland,5"
53. Id. at 878 (Walden, J., dissenting). The facts of the case are revealed in this dissent-
ing opinion.
54. 288 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
55. 301 So. 2d 24 (Fla, 2d Dist. 1974).
56. 269 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
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the plaintiff's witness to an automobile accident, during cross-
examination by the defendant's attorney, testified that there was no
way the plaintiff could have avoided hitting the defendant's vehicle.
The defendant failed to object, at that time, that such an opinion
was inadmissible since the witness had not been qualified as an
expert. On redirect, plaintiff's attorney attempted to have the wit-
ness elaborate on her statement, at which time the defendant's
attorney objected. The trial court overruled the objection, and on
appeal the court held that since the witness' original statement was
made without objection on cross-examination, questions seeking
elaboration of such a point on redirect were permissible within the
discretion of the trial judge.
III. OPINION AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Lay Opinion
Generally, lay opinion testimony is inadmissible because either
the jury is as competent as the layman to draw a conclusion from
the facts, or the subject matter requires expert analysis.
Lay opinion may be admissible, however, for certain purposes."
Thus, an owner may be qualified to testify as to his opinion of the
market value of stolen property at the time of the theft." And, a
building contractor, sued for breach of contract for failure to con-
struct a building according to specifications, may give opinion as to
the present value of the buildings. 5 Furthermore, in a will revoca-
tion proceeding, a disinterested lay witness who had close contacts
with the decedent and was familiar with her handwriting might
properly express an opinion of the handwriting for authentication."
The admissibility of lay opinion to show that a criminal defen-
dant is sane or insane is yet another exception to the general bar
against lay opinion."'
57. The extent of testimony by opinion witnesses usually lies within the discretion of the
trial court. Hughes v. Canal Insurance Co., 308 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
58. Vickers v. State, 303 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974), citing Wright v. State, 251 So.
2d 890 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
59. See Pic v. Hoyt Dev. Co., Inc., 309 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
60. See Clark v. Grimsley, 270 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
61. Butler v. State, 261 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). However, in Hixon v. State, 165
So. 2d 436, 441 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1964), lay witnesses' testimony were excluded because they had
observed the defendant only for a brief time and the symptoms of the accused's type of mental
disorder were difficult for a lay person to detect.
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B. Expert Subject Matter
To prevent an invasion of the province of the jury, expert opin-
ion is inadmissible as to matters within common knowledge.2 The
subject matter of expert testimony must "be so related to some
science, profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the un-
derstanding of the average layman.""
C. Expert Qualifications
A witness offered as an expert must be qualified as such by
having "sufficient skill, knowledge, or experience in that field or
calling as to make it appear that his opinion or inference will prob-
ably aid the trier in his search for truth."'" Florida Rule of Civil
Procedure 1,390(a) defines an "expert witness" as
a person duly and regularly engaged in the practice of his profes-
sion who holds a professional degree from a university or college
and has had special professional training and experience or one
possessed of special knowledge or skill about the subject upon
which he is called to testify.
As a general rule the trial court has a duty "to determine the
qualification of an expert witness on the subject matter on which
he testifies and [the trial court's] judgment will not be disturbed
on appeal unless a clear abuse of discretion is made to appear." 5
Qualifying as an expert in one area may not extend to other
areas. Thus, a chiropractor was properly prohibited from testifying
as to whether plaintiff's poor eyesight was a result of an accident,
when there was no showing that the witness had any expertise in
problems relating to eyes or vision.6
Similary, in Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Hill7 the trial
court found that the local chief of police, who had over 10 years
experience investigating accidents, was not qualified to give an
opinion on a car's speed based on the vehicle's appearance after
62. Farmer v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 258 So. 2d 503 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972), citing
Rosenfeld v. Johnson, 161 So. 2d 703 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964).
63. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Hill, 250 So. 2d 311, 315 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), cert.
discharged, 270 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1973).
64. McCoaRMICK, supra note 1, § 13 at 30.
65. Gates & Sons, Inc. v. Brock, 199 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1967).
66. Aiken v. Miller, 298 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
67. 250 So. 2d 311 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971), cert. discharged, 270 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1973).
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impact with a train. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
found no abuse of the trial judge's discretion and emphasized the
witness' own acknowledgement that he was not a "traffic expert."
Nonetheless, in one questionable decision the Third District, in
effect, expanded the expert's area of expertise. A police officer who
investigated an accident was allowed to give his opinion of the mon-
etary damage sustained by one of the vehicles. 8 The court noted
that the "sole" purpose of the testimony was to assist the jury in
reconstructing the force of impact caused by the collision, and that
the officer had investigated numerous accidents as an investigator
for 7 years. The decision did not clarify how this experience quali-
fied the officer to assess the money damage caused by the collision.
D. Basis of Testimony
An expert may testify as to the facts within his personal knowl-
edge and expert inferences therefrom." In the case of a mental ex-
amination, it is not necessary that the expert state the detailed
circumstances of the examination before giving his finding. The
opposing party may elicit the basis for such inferences on cross-
examination. ' "
As a general rule, the opinion of a physician as to the condition
of an injured plaintiff, based wholly or in part on the history of the
case as told to him by the plaintiff, is inadmissible when the exami-
nation was made for the purpose of qualifying the physician to
testify as a medical witness." Such a physician is referred to as an
''examining physician" as contrasted with a "treating physician"
who actually administers to a patient for purposes of treatment. In
Marine Exploration Co. v. McCoy," a doctor examined the plaintiff
once and testified as to the extent of his disability. The doctor's
opinion was based partially on information supplied by the plaintiff
but partially on the doctor's own observations along with hospital
records which were introduced into evidence. The defendant
claimed that even partial reliance on the plaintiff's representations
rendered the doctor's opinion inadmissible. The court, on appeal,
68. Waller v. Traud, 301 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
69. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 14 at 31-32.
70. Jones v. State, 289 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1974).
71. Marshall v. Papineau, 132 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1961).
72. 308 So. 2d 43 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
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affirmed the trial court's holding that the medical opinion, under
such circumstances, was admissible. The fact that the plaintiff sup-
plied a partial basis for the doctor's opinion was a factor for the jury
to consider in determining the weight and credibility it should af-
ford the testimony.
E. Form of Testimony
A common method of exacting opinions from experts on the
particular facts of a case is by use of hypothetical questions. Hypo-
thetical questions must be based on facts supported by "competent
substantial evidence in the record at the time the question is asked
or by reasonable inferences from such evidence."73 The examining
party, however, in propounding the hypothet, may use such evi-
dence viewed in a light most favorable to him. Thus, in a personal
injury action which resulted from a collision between a motorcycle
and a truck74 where experts were called upon by the defense to
estimate the speed of the vehicles on impact, the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, held that the experts could choose controv-
erted evidence most favorable to the side of the defense in arriving
at their conclusions.
Nonetheless, hypotheticals must be based on facts in the record
and must include facts sufficient for the expert to form an opinion. 5
Ordinarily, of course, only the expert and not the trial judge would
be in a position to know whether he has been submitted sufficient
facts. For this reason "deficiencies in a factual predicate . . . nor-
mally relate to the weight and not the admissibility of the opin-
ion."7 Still, an objection to the adequacy of the predicate will be
sustained where the hypothetical "omits a fact which is so obviously
necessary to formation of an opinion that the trial judge may take
note of the omission on the basis of his common knowledge. . . .
In Nat Harrison Associates, Inc. v. Byrd,7" an expert was asked to
73. Nat Harrison Associates v. Byrd, 256 So. 2d 50, 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971). See also
Cromarty v. Ford Motor Co., 308 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
74. Seibels, Bruce & Co. v. Giddings, 264 So. 2d 103, 105-06 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
75. Steiger v. Massachusetts Cas. Ins. Co., 273 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); Nat
Harrison Associates v. Byrd, 256 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
76. 256 So. 2d at 53.
77. Id.
78. 256 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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determine hypothetically the difference in speed between two vehi-
cles at the time of collision. Photographs depicting damages to the
vehicles were the only basis in evidence for an opinion of their rela-
tive speeds. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that
because a necessary factual predicate, the weight of the vehicles,7"
was not contained in the hypothetical nor supported by any evi-
dence previously presented, the expression of opinion was inadmis-
sible.
F. Weight and Sufficiency
Florida law is settled that "[e]xpert testimony, though per-
suasive, is not conclusive or binding on the jury, and the jury is free
to determine its credibility and to decide the weight to be as-
cribed."I"
In Bhem v. Division of Administration,"' a case involving con-
demnation through eminent domain, the issue at trial was the
amount of business damages suffered by the condemnee. The expert
opined that the amount was $19,175. The condemning authority
offered no evidence, apparently relying on his attack of the com-
demnee's presentation. The jury awarded $9,500. The condemnee
argued, on appeal, that under these circumstances the jury was
bound by the expert's figure. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth
District, however, held that the expert testimony was a maximum
amount requested, not a minimum amount admitted, and pursuant
to the general rule that expert opinion is not binding upon a jury,
the court affirmed the jury's finding. In so doing, however, the court
took notice of the fact that their decision was in direct conflict with
the decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District, in
Jacksonville v. Yerkes.82 In that case the condemnor's expert's opin-
ion was stricken, being based upon certain incorrect facts. The con-
demnor put on no further evidence and the court held that in the
absence of contrary evidence the fact finder was constrained to
adopt the condemnee's expert's opinion as to the dollar amount of
damages.
79. The necessity of knowing the weight of each vehicle was acknowledged by the expert
in prior testimony.
80. Trolinger v. State, 300 So. 2d 310, 311 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); see Vaillancourt v. State,
288 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1974); Byrd v. State 297 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1974).
81. 292 So. 2d 437 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
82. 282 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
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The above cases deal with the weight which is to be afforded
an expert's opinion. But what of the sufficiency of the opinion itself?
In E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Stickney,83 the plaintiff's two medi-
cal experts testified that the Squibb Company's orthopedic grafting
matter, Boplant, was, in their opinions, inherently defective due to
the presence of antigen residuals. The appellate court, in reversing
a jury award against Squibb for negligence, breach of express and
implied warranty, and fraud, held as to this expert testimony:
The fact that the product contained antigen residuals which oc-
casionally cause the graft to fail forms no proper basis for the
conclusion that the product is inherently defective in view of the
high percentage of success realized in thousands of other similar
operations. It has been uniformly held that the testimony of an
expert witness which is premised solely upon a demonstrably
false assumption of fact or patent misconception of law is not a
sufficiently competent foundation to sustain a verdict."
In overturning the jury verdict the court was not interfering with the
jury's function of weighing the expert testimony; rather, it was de-
ciding as a matter of law that the expert opinions were legally insuf-
ficient.
IV. COMPETENCY AND PRIVILEGES
A. Children
When a child is called as a witness, it is the judge's duty and
normal practice to examine the child to ascertain his competence
to testify.85 As a general rule the trial judge is vested with broad
discretion in allowing the testimony of minors."s The prime test of
a minor's competency to testify is intelligence rather than age. 7
In Davis v. State,88 a 7-year-old was allowed to testify at a non-
nonjury trial even though she was initally too timid to respond fully
to the State Attorney's questions. Refusing to grant defense coun-
83. 274 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1st Dist.), cert. denied, 285 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 961 (1974).
84. Id. at 907; see Limmiatis v. Canal Authority, 253 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
85. Bill v. State, 93 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1957).
86. Clinton v. State, 53 Fla. 98, 43 So. 312 (1907).
87. Bill v. State, 93 So. 2d 575 (Fla. 1957).
88. 264 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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sel's motion to exclude the witness, the trial judge permitted her to
sit on his lap and finish testifying. On appeal, the court noted that
since "the evidence of intelligence, ability to recall, relate and to
appreciate the nature and obligations of an oath are not fully pro-
trayed by a bare record. . ." allowing the testimony was within the
discretion of the trial judge."9 The decision was rendered with the
recognition that the trial judge, in exercising his discretion, had
utilized the same criteria in declaring the minor's two younger
brothers to be incompetent.
In Sarles v. State,"0 involving a probation revocation hearing,
the court held that it was not an abuse of discretion to allow a 12-
year-old to testify. In Hall v. State,"' the 8-year-old child of an
alleged rape victim testified that he was in the third grade, went to
Sunday school, and knew the meaning of an oath to tell the truth.
The decision to permit him to testify was held to be within the
judge's sound discretion.
Harrold v. Schluep established that the trial court should
make a special effort to instruct a child plaintiff on the meaning and
obligation of truthfulness. Morevoer, the child need not understand
the specific penalties of perjury but only comprehend that some-
thing will happen if he lies. Harrold involved a minor bicyclist, 6
years, 8 months of age, who brought suit against a motorist for
injuries sustained in a collision. There being no witnesses to the
conduct of either party prior to impact other than the opposing
party, it was vital to the plaintiff's case that he be allowed to testify
as to his and the defendant's behavior. Nonetheless, the trial court
found the plaintiff incompetent to testify. However, the court, on
appeal, directed that a more determined and special effort should
have been made to qualify the child as a witness in view of the fact
that his claim depended largely on having an opportunity to deny
the motorist's testimony as to his inappropriate bicycle handling or
to explain his version of the manner in which the collision occurred.
The court set out criteria for qualifying a child as to compe-
tency. First, intelligence and the ability to understand are the prime
test of competency. Children must have sufficient intelligence to
89. Id. at 32, citing Clinton v. State, 53 Fla. 98, 43 So. 312 (1907).
90. 294 So. 2d 95 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
91. 260 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972).
92. 264 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
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receive impressions of the facts about which they testify and the
capacity to relate those facts correctly. In addition, the child must
appreciate the nature and obligation of the oath, however the trial
judge may instruct the child in this respect. The child need not
understand specific consequences of lying, merely that it will pro-
duce effects adverse to him.
Since the trial court failed to sufficiently assist the plaintiff in
the instant case, and insufficiently pursued an inquiry into the
child's actual ability to understand and communicate truth, the
case was remanded. Special note was made by the court that the
unfamiliar courtroom environment may have contributed to the
child's responses. The court apparently desired the trial judge to
take steps to neutralize this factor.
B. Drugs
In Collie v. State,93 the court held that a trial judge may strike
the testimony of a witness observed by the court to be under the
influence of drugs at the time of testifying. In this particular case,
the witness did not even know where she was. It should be noted,
however, that the Collie holding was partially based on the fact that
the witness' testimony constituted cumulative evidence.
C. Settlement Offers
Offers or agreements to settle or compromise claims generally
are excluded on the basis of a strong public policy favoring out of
court settlements. 4 However, under some circumstances, reference
to settlements may reach the jury. In Compania Dominicana de
Aviacion v. Knapp,9" a plane crashed into an automobile paint and
body shop, resulting in a personal injury action against the airline
and its insurer. A witness to the crash, while testifying, implied that
the defendant insurance company had paid for the cleanup of the
cars he kept on a nearby lot. Although an objection to this implica-
tion was sustained and the jury instructed to disregard it, the defen-
dant insurance company sought a new trial, considering such pay-
93. 267 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
94. Bill Currie Ford, Inc. v. Cash, 252 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971), overruled on other
grounds, 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973).
95. 251 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971).
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ment to be the settlement of a remote claim and its mention to the
jury improper. However, the court on appeal, held the statement
non-prejudicial, given its remoteness to the personal injury action,
and stated that in any event, the trial court's instruction to disre-
gard the statement was sufficient to correct any harm done.
Settlement agreements between a plaintiff and one of several
co-defendants whereby the liability of the agreeing co-defendant is
variable, depending on the verdict as to the non-agreeing co-
defendant, are also admissible."
D. Psychiatrists and Psychologists
A court ordered psychiatric examination is generally not con-
sidered violative of a defendant's right to freedom from compelled
self-incrimination. Psychiatrists may render opinions concerning
sanity based on factual statements made by the defendant-patient;
however, direct testimony concerning facts surrounding a crime,
ascertained during a compulsory mental examination, is prohib-
ited. 7
In Roseman v. State," a criminal prosecution, the defendant
claimed prejudicial error when the trial judge allowed psychiatrists
to testify as to facts the defendant revealed concerning his partici-
pation in a crime. But the court noted that the defense itself had
elicited in detail, through testimony of its own doctors, all the facts
and circumstances leading up to and including the alleged crime,
thereby making that information no longer privileged.
Parkin v. State" settled the law in Florida that a defendant
relying on an insanity defense must cooperate with court-appointed
experts or be precluded from offering the testimony of his privately
engaged expert on the matter. However, in McMunn v. State, 00 the
court expressed concern about the Parkin rule as it related to the
privilege against self-incrimination. The State had urged that the
defendant be compelled to cooperate with a court-appointed psychi-
atrist if he wished to rely on an insanity defense and that the State
96. These "Mary Carter" agreements are discussed in detail in section V, D, 9, infra.
97. Parkin v. State, 230 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970).
98. 293 So. 2d 64 (Fla. 1974).
99. 238 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1970).
100. 264 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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then be allowed to impeach the defendant's testimony by interro-
gating the court-appointed psychiatrist regarding statements made
to him by the defendant. The court viewed this proposed impeach-
ment technique as equivalent to coercing a confession and violative
of the defendant's right against self-incrimination.
The reasoning of McMunn was blended with that of Parkin in
Jones v. State. "I There the State claimed that statements made by
a defendant to a psychiatrist engaged only to examine the defendant
and testify at trial are not properly in evidence, and therefore, are
not an allowable basis for expert testimony. °2 Thus, the State main-
tained, such expert testimony is admissible only if the defendant
himself testifies to the statements made to the psychiatrist. The
supreme court rejected this view, holding that the effect of such an
exlcusionary ruling would require the defendant to take the stand
against his will before allowing him to introduce expert testimony
as to his defense of insanity.
Interesting dictum from the Jones court stated that unless a
person is a raving maniac or complete imbecile, a jury can hardly
be deemed competent to reach a satisfactory decision on the ques-
tion of his mental condition without the aid of expert witnesses. Yet
2 weeks later in Byrd v. State,0 3 the same court upheld a rape
conviction where the State presented no medical testimony what-
soever while the defense presented two psychiatrists who testified
as to the insanity of the appellant at the time of the offense. The
State presented only the testimony of two lay witnesses regarding
the appellant's sanity. Finding that the evidence of insanity which
the appellant sought to introduce at trial was insufficient to create
the requisite reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury, the supreme
court upheld the conviction since a jury does not necessarily have
to accept expert testimony over non-expert testimony. 4
E. Attorney-Client
The reconciliation of interests in privacy and confidentiality
with the countervailing need for evidence is the major problem fac-
ing the courts in the area of attorney-client privilege. For example,
101. 289 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 1974).
102. See Section III, D, supra.
103. 297 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1974).
104. See Section III, F, supra.
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in Anderson v. State,'"5 the defendant, charged with stealing and
receiving stolen property, hired an attorney and on his own initia-
tive turned the property over to the attorney's receptionist. The
attorney then gave the property to the police, whereupon the prose-
cution subpoenaed the attorney and his receptionist to testify how
and from whom they had received the property. In holding that
neither the attorney nor the receptionist could be made to testify,
the court found the nonverbal communication on the part of the
defendant in the act of turning over the property to be privileged.
Under these circumstances, the court said that to require the attor-
ney to testify would do violence to the fundamental concept of the
attorney-client privilege since such testimony would conclusively
show that the defendant once had the stolen property in his
possession.
The growing size and importance of the public defender's office
has possible ramifications in the area of attorney-client privilege. In
Olds v. State, 0 a public defender was found in contempt of court
for attemping to use certain evidence to impeach a prosecution wit-
ness after the trial judge had instructed the attorney to desist. The
evidence sought to be introduced for impeachment purposes was
made known to the public defender through his office, which had
represented the witness in a prior case in which he was a defendant.
The trial judge believed the material communicated by the witness
to the public defender's office to be privileged. However, on appeal,
the court pointed out that all such communication either took place
in the presence of a third person or was otherwise not "confiden-
tial." Since the appellant public defender was under a duty to de-
fend his client zealously, the contempt finding was reversed. How-
ever, the court took notice of the potential for conflict in the future
where one of several co-defendants represented by the public de-
fender's office later appears as a prosecution witness against a for-
mer co-defendant.
F. Immunity from Prosecution
Florida Statutes section 914.04 (1973) does not permit a witness
to refuse to testify on the grounds that the testimony might incrimi-
nate him, but provides immunity from any prosecution arising out
105. 297 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
106. 302 So. 2d 787 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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of any transaction or matter about which is testified. In Lurie v.
Florida State Board of Dentistry,'07 the petitioner, a state licensed
dentist, was granted immunity from prosecution at the time he was
compelled to testify about his involvement in a stolen car ring. This
testimony was subsequently used by the State Board of Dentistry
to revoke his license. The Supreme Court of Florida, overruling a
prior decision,'"' recognized an extended scope of the statutory im-
munity, to bar not only future criminal prosecutions but adminis-
trative revocations of professional licenses as well."9
G. Informers
A frequent question in criminal litigation is whether the State
can be forced to reveal the identity of its confidential informers. The
answer turns on the use to which the informers' statements are put.
Thus, for example, in a probation revocation proceeding, as opposed
to a trial, the judge is given considerable discretion in requiring
informers to be identified."0
In State v. Katz,"' where the informants' statements were not
sought to be used against the defendant at trial, but merely contrib-
uted to the probable cause which was the basis of a search warrant,
the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that disclosure
of the informers' identity was not required. The court relied in part
on the authority of Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(c)(2)
which provides that disclosure of an informant shall not be required
unless the informant is to be produced at a hearing or trial, or if
failure to disclose the identity will infringe upon the constitutional
rights of the accused."12
In English v. State,"' the defendant filed a motion to compel
disclosure of the identity of an informant on the ground that the
informant's testimony was essential to the defendant's defense of
entrapment. Since the defendant was charged with delivery and sale
of drugs, and the informant did induce the defendant to sell to an
107. 288 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1973).
108. Headly v. Baron, 228 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1969). (Lurie reinstated the holding of Florida
State Bd. of Architecture v. Seymour, 62 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1952)).
109. See State ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n 281 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1973).
110. Singletary v. State, 290 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
111. 295 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
112. See also State v. Davis, 308 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
113. 301 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
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agent, and was present at the alleged sale, the court ordered the
informant's identity disclosed.
In Ricketts v. State, 4 the informant had been an active partici-
pant in an illegal lottery operation and was the only witness who was
in a position to amplify or contradict the testimony of a State wit-
ness. Under such circumstances, the defendant was entitled to dis-
closure of the informer's identity, and the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, held as reversible error the trial court's refusal to
compel such disclosure.
The Third District reached a different result in Jackson v.
State, "I a case in which the informant did not deal directly with the
defendant as in Ricketts. Although here the informant's activities
in assisting an undercover officer to effectuate a sale of narcotics
were significant, and he was present and did witness the alleged
transactions, the court found these facts to be insufficent to require
disclosure of his identity.
In an earlier discussion" 6 the Third District had quashed an
order requiring disclosure of a confidential informant where the in-
formant had not introduced the defendant to the law enforcement
officer and did not witness the alleged criminal transaction. In Doe
v. State, "7 where the informant drove an officer to a pool hall and
exchanged greetings with the defendant, but did not arrange the
transaction, the Third District noted, as it later would in Jackson, "I
that the mere presence of the informer at an illegal drug sale or an
introduction to set up the sale by the defendant to an officer would
not require disclosure of the informer's identity.
If the State refuses to comply with an order to disclose the
informer's identity, the trial judge may dismiss the case as a legiti-
mate exercise of the court's inherent authority to compel obedience
of its orders. If the State believes the order compelling disclosure as
in error, the proper remedy is timely appellate review of the order.",
H. Self-Incrimination
The potential conflict between the right to remain silent and.
114. 305 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
115. 307 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
116. State v. Brown, 285 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
117. 262 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
118. Jackson v. State, 307 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975).
119. State v. Wells, 308 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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the need for evidence is exemplified by Salem v. State,"' where a
defendant-attorney and his partner were investigated by a grand
jury. During the investigation the defendant was granted immunity,
pursuant to a Florida statute,' from criminal prosecution of all
charges except perjury.
However, he was found guilty of contempt by the grand jury for
giving false, evasive, and unresponsive testimony. Subsequently,
the defendant was called as a witness at the trial of his law partner
and again was offered immunity from all charges except perjury.
This time he refused to testify on the ground that his statements
would tend to be self-incriminating. The basis of his fear was that
his testimony at the trial, no matter how truthful, would be com-
pared with his grand jury testimony, which had already been de-
clared false, and thus he would be prosecuted for perjury. In revers-
ing the trial court's contempt judgment, the District Court of Ap-
peal, Third District, held that the defendant was constitutionally
entitled to assert his "right of silence" and that "[the right to be
free from compelled self-incrimination] not only exempt[s] one
from answering questions that directly incriminate but ...
extend[s] . . .to questions that in anywise tend to incriminate."'
Because of the absolute nature of the right, the courts have
been willing to find broad waivers of it where accused persons testify
on their own behalf. Thus, it has generally been held that an ac-
cused waives his privilege to refuse to testify to the extent of permis-
sible cross-examination by taking the stand in his own defense., 3 In
addition, one who institutes a law suit waives any right he might
have had to avoid answering relevant questions even though the
answers may be incriminating.' 4 In Lely Estates, Inc. v. Polly,'5 for
example, an employee brought an action against his employer for
breach of the employment contract. The employee contended that
certain payments to him were commissions while the employer
argued that they were loans. The District Court of Appeal, Second
District, held that it was reversible error not to allow cross-
120. 305 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
121. FLA. STAT. § 914.04 (1973).
122. Salem v. State, 305 So. 2d 23, 28 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), quoting State v. Sullivan, 37
So. 2d 907 (Fla. 1948).
123. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 132 at 278; accord, Kilgore v. State, 271 So. 2d 148 (Fla.
2d Dist. 1972).
124. Minor v. Minor, 232 So. 2d 746 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1970), a/I'd, 240 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 1970).
125. 308 So. 2d 165 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1975).
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examination of the plaintiff as to whether the payments had been
reported as income on his tax returns, regardless of whether plain-
tiff's answers might incriminate him.
Despite such cases which liberally construe certain acts as
waivers of rights against self-incrimination, in other situations the
courts have been extremely protective. In Walton v. Robert E. Haas
Construction Corp.,'26 one of the plaintiffs was a witness in a prior
wrongful death action involving the same accident at issue in the
instant case. He had previously declined to answer certain questions
during the taking of a deposition in the prior case, based on his right
against self-incrimination, fearing the possibility of a manslaughter
charge. However, in his own suit he claimed no right and answered
all questions. The trial court allowed as evidence, for impeachment
purposes, the prior invocation of the right. In reversing this decision,
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the constitu-
tional right against self-incrimination prevents the admission in a
civil case of the exercise of the privilege in a prior action. In addi-
tion, such prior invocation of the right cannot be regarded as im-
peachment since the fact that one claims a constitutional right may
not be said to show a disregard for the truth.
State v. Dawson'27 also exemplifies strict scrutiny of a waiver.
In Dawson, the defendant was an attorney who practiced as a pro-
fessional service corporation. He had been charged with grand lar-
ceny against several insurance companies by fraudulent representa-
tions in the settlement of automobile accident claims on behalf of
his clients. During the course of its investigation, the grand jury
subpoenaed the defendant's employees to produce records of the
defendant's professional corporation, which were produced under
protest. The trial court dismissed the grand jury's indictments. Af-
firming on appeal, the district court held that the general rule 121
precluding a corporation from exercising a right against self-
incrimination was inapplicable to a professional service corporation.
The court's rationale was based on examination of the legislative
intent of the Professional Service Corporation Act of Florida, 2 '
which was enacted for the purpose of providing tax advantages
while also attempting to preserve the non-corporate status of the
126. 259 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 3d Dist 1972).
127. 290 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
128. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 121 at 269.
129. FLA. STAT. §§ 621 et seq. (1973).
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professional.'" Thus, the court adopted the defendant's contention
that all documents produced by the employees were personal to him
as an attorney and that he, through his employees, was being com-
pelled to produce evidence in violation of his right against self-
incrimination.
Traditionally, the right to be free from compelled self-
incrimination does not protect against matters which could not give
rise to criminal liability.'3 ' However, the Supreme Court of Florida,
in State ex rel. Vininzg v. Florida Real Estate Commission,32 de-
parted from the traditional rule and expanded the scope of the right.
The defendant was charged by the Real Estate Commission with
violation of the Florida real estate license law,'33 which required the
defendant to file sworn answers to the charges. Failure to deny the
charges would result in the charges being deemed admitted. The
defendant refused to answer the commission's question. The court
found the statutory requirement to violate his right against self-
incrimination and therefore prohibited the commission from enforc-
ing so much of the statute as required the defendant, in a discipli-
nary proceeding, to respond to the charges against him. Basing its
decision on In Re Gault'34 and Spevack v. Klein,'33 the court held
"that the right to remain silent applies not only to the traditional
criminal case, but also to proceedings 'penal' in nature in that they
tend to degrade the individual's professional standing, professional
reputation or livelihood."'36 The court noted a national trend apply-
ing the right against self-incrimination to "penal" proceedings re-
gardless of their "criminal" status in the traditional sense.
I. Insurance
Prior to Shingleton v. Bussey,'37 any purposeful reference to
insurance policy limits during a trial when it was not relevant, could
be grounds for reversal.'38 Subsequent to Shingleton there existed
130. 290 So. 2d at 82.
131. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 121 at 256.
132. 281 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1973); accord, Kozerowitz v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 289
So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1974).
133. FLA. STAT. §§ 475 et seq. (1973).
134. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
135. 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
136. 281 So. 2d at 491.
137. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
138. Pierce v. Smith, 301 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
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two schools of judicial thought with regard to the mentioning of
insurance policy limits before a jury. One held that such a reference
to a jury constituted harmful error as a matter of law while the other
took the position that the question of harmful error in relation to
the mention of insurance limits was a factural question to be deter-
mined by a review of the record in each case.' The latter approach
was adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida in Stecher v.
Pomeroy"' where it held that insurance limits should not be men-
tioned to the jury, but if such mention is made, it constitutes harm-
less error where the jury's verdict has not been adversely affected
thereby.
The supreme court amplified the Stecher holding in Josey v.
Futch"I by enumerating potential factors which may be indicative
of adverse jury influence, including the size of the verdict in relation
to the policy limits, the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries,
and the amount originally sought by the plaintiff. The position now
taken by the Florida courts has resulted in a series of decisions
which focus on the facts of each case to determine whether the
admission of the insurance evidence substantially affected the jury's
decision.'
J. Identification by Decedant's Family
Generally, Florida courts have found prejudicial error when, in
a homicide prosecution, a member of the deceased's family is called
to testify concerning identification of the victim when unrelated
witnesses are available.'43 There are, however, exceptions to the rule.
If the jury already knows that the victim was survived by the wit-
ness because of other evidence ascertained from that witness, it is
harmless error if the related witness testifies concerning the victim's
identity. Such testimony establishes nothing to prejudice the defen-
139. Josey v. Futch, 254 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1971).
140. 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971).
141. 254 So. 2d 786 (Fla. 1971).
142. Allred v. Chittenden Pool Supply, Inc., 298 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1974); Peppe v. Clow,
307 So. 2d 886 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1975); Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Odoms, 306 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1st
Dist. 1975); Pierce v. Smith, 301 So. 2d 805 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); Millitello v. Guest, 248 So.
2d 662, quashed 254 So. 2d 195, on remand, 258 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1972), (verdict by
district court due to insurance evidence quashed and remanded in light of Stecher v. Pome-
roy); Compania Dominicana de Aviacion v. Knapp, 251 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1971). But
cf. Cook v. Eney, 277 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973) (evidence of workman's compensation).
143. See Scott v. State, 256 So. 2d 19, 20 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
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dant that is not already before the jury. If a relative does so testify,
and in the process makes highly prejudicial remarks, the defense
attorney may move for a mistrial, or in the alternative, a polling of
the jury. If he receives and accepts the latter and makes no further
motion for mistrial, error is waived.'
In Barrett v. State' the victim's father identified a photograph
at trial. The defense did not move for a mistrial until the close of
all the evidence. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
despite the availability of other reasoning, 4 ' determined that failure
to make a timely objection to this form of identification was fatal.
The court stated:
The accused in a criminal proceeding is not entitled to the
privilege of refraining from making timely objection to matters
felt to be prejudicial and then waiting until the relative strength
of the prosecution . . . can be evaluated before raising a cry of
prejudice.'47
K. Witness Lists
In Williams v. State, 4 the defendant was convicted by eyewit-
ness accounts of an armed robbery. Without having exchanged wit-
ness lists, the defendant attempted at trial to produce three rela-
tives to testify that they had loaned the defendant the money which
was in his possession when he was apprehended. Although he had
told counsel who had initially represented him about the witnesses,
the defendant failed to inform counsel representing him at trial
about them. The trial judge excluded the witnesses summarily be-
cause the defendant had requested the exchange of witness lists but
had failed to furnish a complete witness list himself pursuant to
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.220(g).'49 The District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed, holding that a witness should
be excluded only under the most compelling circumstances. Where
a party fails to produce a complete witness list, as here, the court
should inquire as to why disclosure was not made, the extent of
144. Foster v. State, 266 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
145. 266 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
146. See Scott v. State 256 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
147. 266 So. 2d at 375.
148. 264 So. 2d 106 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
149. Amended and renumbered as FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(j).
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prejudice, and intermediate means available to rectify the preju-
dice.
Although the earlier case of Cacciatore v. State' reached a
different result on facts similar to those in Williams, the two cases
are distinguishable. In Williams, the witnesses could well have
changed the outcome of the case by testifying as to the origin of the
money, while in Cacciatore the court found that the testimony from
the excluded witnesses would not have affected the result in its case.
V. IMPEACHMENT
A. Generally
The purpose of impeachment evidence is not to adduce proof,
but to annul the harmful effects of adverse testimony by reflecting
unfavorably on a witness' credibility. 51 Credibility of a witness may
be called into question by showing that a witness has made contra-
dictory statements regarding material testimony, or has been con-
victed of a crime, or has had a bad reputation for truth and veracity,
or has some motive, interest, or bias in giving the particular testi-
mony which is under attack. 5 ' However, such impeachment evi-
dence should not be considered as substantive evidence, and an
opposing party is generally entitled to an instruction on this point.'53
Impeachment is proper at one of two stages during a trial: (1)
on cross-examination of a witness and (2) on rebuttal, through an-
other witness or by documentary evidence (technically termed im-
peachment by contradiction).' 5 However, the "collateral fact" limi-
tation may be applicable. Unless the testimony sought to be im-
peached concerns a relevant and material fact, a witness may not
be impeached. For example, if X's relevant testimony is that a
traffic light was red when the defendant passed through it, X may
not normally be impeached by evidence concerning X's statement
of his occupation, that being only collateral testimony.'55 Generally
150. 226 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
151. Thomas v. State, 289 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974), citing Adams v. State, 34
Fla. 185, 15 So. 905 (1894). But see Wallace v. Rashkow, 270 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
152. See Taylor v. State, 139 Fla. 542, 549, 190 So. 691, 694 (1939).
153. Thomas v. State, 289 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974). The instruction point is
discussed in Wallace v. Rashkow, 270 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). See also Walter v. State,
272 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
154. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 33 at 66 and § 47 at 97.
155. Statewright v. State, 278 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973), quashed on other grounds,
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though, impeachment by showing motive, bias, interest, prior con-
viction, or poor reputation for truth and veracity is not subject to
the collateral fact rule. 56
Furthermore, an impeachment attempt may be denied if the
evidence offered is prejudicial and likely to be misused by the jury.
In Cook v. Eney,15 7 a medical malpractice action, the defendant-
appellee claimed he was correctly permitted by the trial court to
question the plaintiff concerning the latter's receipt of social secu-
rity and workmen's compensation benefits-such inquiry being for
the purpose of impeaching plaintiff's earlier testimony concerning
his motivation and desire to return to work. The District Court of
Appeal, Third District, disagreed, holding the impeachment evi-
dence was likely to be unduly prejudicial since the jury might have
been led to feel the plaintiff had already been compensated.
B. Impeaching One's Own Witness
Section 90.09 of Florida Statutes sets forth the rule concerning
impeachment of one's own witness, permitting in certain situations
impeachment by inconsistent statements.'58 The statute somewhat
relaxes the strict and arbitrary common law rule which had abso-
lutely forbidden impeaching one's own witness. Since it abrogates
the common law, the statute has been strictly construed, thus
perpetuating much of the injustice which has occurred under the
common law rule. 59
300 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1974); Whitley v. State, 265 So. 2d 99 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); MCCORMICK,
supra note 1, § 33 at 66 and § 47 at 98.
156. See Alford v. State, 47 Fla. 1, 36 So. 436 (1904).
157. 277 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
158. A party producing a witness shall not be allowed to impeach his credit by general
evidence of bad character, but he may, in case the witness prove adverse, contradict him by
other evidence, or prove that he has made at other times a statement inconsistent with his
present testimony; but before such last mentioned proof can be given, the circumstances of
the supposed statement, sufficient to designate the particular occasion, must be mentioned
to the witness, and he must be asked whether or not he made such statement. (emphasis
added) FLA. STAT. § 90.09 (1973).
159. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 38 at 75-78, presents a concise criticism of the rule:
(1) the party calling the witness does not actually vouch for his trustworthiness. He calls only
those witnesses who happened to have observed the particular facts in controversy; (2) if the
witness lies so as to benefit the opposing party, the adversary will not attack him, and the
calling party is not permitted to do so under the rule; (3) restricting impeachment by prior
inconsistent statements, as in the Florida statute, also restricts proper evaluation of a witness'
testimony and is a serious obstruction to discovering the truth. See also Comment,
Impeaching One's Own Witness, 49 VA. L. REv. 996 (1963).
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Secton 90.09 only applies in those cases in which the witness
proves to be adverse.'° This limitation, however, may be circum-
vented by explaining the inquiry not as an attempt to impeach the
witness, but as merely a means to refresh his memory or "to awaken
his conscience" for the purpose of drawing out an explanation of his
apparent inconsistency.''
In civil actions, the common law prohibition of impeaching
one's own witness has been abolished when the person called is an
adverse party witness. Pursuant to Rule 1.450(a) of the Florida
Rules of Civil Procedure, an adverse party witness may be contra-
dicted and impeached as if he had been a witness called by the
adverse party.
C. Impeachment By Inconsistent Statements
1. FOUNDATION
Prior to impeachment of a witness by his inconsistent state-
ments, it is necessary to lay a proper predicate for such impeach-
ment. A proper foundation is laid on cross-examination by asking
the witness about the circumstances of the inconsistent statement
so as to designate the particular occasion (time, place, persons
involved, etc.). Further, the witness must be asked whether or not
he made such a statement. 2
When a witness, during the setting of the foundation, states
that he does not remember making any such prior inconsistent
statement, a proper predicate cannot be laid and impeachment is
not permitted.' 3 However, this rule does not apply in a criminal
case where the accused's statement is in the nature of an admission
or confession which is admissible as direct evidence of guilt. 4
Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Zuflet,15 involved a collision
160. See Thomas v. State, 289 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974); Jones v. State, 273 So.
2d 8 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); Maness v. State, 262 So. 2d 716 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972); Gibbs v. State,
193 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
161. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 38 at 77.
162. Jones v. State, 281 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973); Bright v. State, 250 So. 2d 10
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1971); FLA. STAT. § 90.10 (1973).
163. Covington v. State, 302 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); Walter v. State, 272 So. 2d
180 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973). Compare Sutton v. State, 239 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970), with
Rankin v. State, 143 So.2d 193 (Fla. 1962). See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 37 at 72, for the
proposition that the impeaching party should be permitted to prove the making of the prior
inconsistent statement.
164. Covington v. State 302 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
165. 280 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
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between an automobile and a train. The defendant, trying to prove
that the plaintiff driver was intoxicated, was not permitted to im-
peach a witness' testimony that a whiskey bottle found in the auto
had not been opened. Failure to lay a proper foundation prevented
the defendant from introducing a photograph of a bottle of whiskey
found in the wrecked automobile with its seal broken and part of
the contents missing.
A further trap for the unwary materializes when impeachment
by animus (motive, bias, etc.) is attempted and the impeachment
testimony goes beyond mere animus and shows contradictory state-
ments. As a general rule, no foundation need be set for impeach-
ment by rebuttal testimony showing animus. However, where the
intended animus testimony goes further and exposes a prior incon-
sistent statement, a foundation must be laid on cross-examination
of the witness being contradicted.' 6
2. OTHERWISE INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
Evidence rendered inadmissible for failure to advise a defen-
dant of his Miranda rights, or by improper search and seizure, is not
barred for all purposes. In Oregon v. Haas, "7 the United States
Supreme Court held that even though a defendant's Miranda rights
were violated, thus rendering his inculpatory statements inadmissi-
ble in the prosecution's case in chief, such statements were admissi-
ble for impeachment purposes when the defendant testified con-
trary to his prior inculpatory statements.""6 A similar rule has been
applied in Florida in situations where the evidence is inadmissible
because obtained pursuant to an illegal search. 6 '
Furthermore, the logic of the rule permitting impeachment use
of otherwise inadmissible evidence has been recognized, although in
dicta, in civil cases. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co. v. Riley7 ' was
an action for libel against an insurance adjuster arising out of a
previous automobile accident case. The plaintiff in the prior suit,
also the plaintiff in the libel action, had told the adjuster, in privi-
leged communication, that he, the plaintiff, was speeding at the
166. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. Hunt, 299 So. 2d 84 (Fla. ]st Dist. 1974).
167. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
168. See State v. Retherford, 270 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 1972); Walls v. State, 279 So. 2d 95
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
169. Dornau v. State, 306 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
170. 294 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
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time of the accident. At trial, the plaintiff denied he was speeding
and the adjuster was called to impeach the plaintiff's statement.
The privileged inconsistent statement was allowed over objection.
The plaintiff then obtained a judgment against the adjuster for
libel. On appeal, the court stated that a party cannot avoid being
impeached through use of a prior inconsistent statement on the
ground that the statement was privileged and therefore inadmissi-
ble as direct evidence.
3. POLICE REPORTS
In a conflict certiorari case,' the Supreme Court of Florida has
held that police reports may be used to impeach a testifying officer
regarding a critical, material, and vital point which is reasonably
exculpatory of the defendant, provided an in camera review is first
conducted to delete extraneous matter.
The court also indicated that negative use of police reports
should not usually be permitted. An example of negative use would
be: "Why did you not include in your report the fact, as you testified
here today, that the defendant was dressed in dark clothing?" How-
ever, a positive, proper use might be permitted, such as: "Why did
you indicate in your report that the defendant was not injured and
yet testify here today that the defendant was shot and bleeding?"
The fact that the reports are often short and incomplete and
made under pressures of investigation may presumably be raised on
redirect. It remains to be seen what effect the court's decision will
have upon the quality of police reports since omissions therein are
encouraged as a result.
4. STATEMENTS IN PLEADINGS
Generally, pleadings in the case at trial are not admissible to
prove or disprove a fact in issue since they are only a tentative
outline of the pleader's case subject to change and prior to full
development of the facts.' However, if relevant, pleadings filed in
a prior lawsuit are admissible in a later suit for impeachment pur-
poses.7 3 This is true even if the pleadings are unverified or unsigned
171. State v. Johnson, 284 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1973). See also Jones v. State, 281 So. 2d
398 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
172. Harrold v. Schluep, 264 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), citing Hines v. Trager
Constr. Co., 188 So. 2d 826, 831 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
173. Id. citing Davidson v. Eddings, 262 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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by the witness against whom impeachment is directed provided that
the party seeking admission establishes that the witness actually
suplied the information contained in the pleadings.'7
5. PRIOR CONSISTENT STATEMENTS
The usual rule is that a witness' testimony may not be bolstered
or corroborated by his own prior consistent statement. However, it
is permissible to use prior consistent statements to "rehabilitate"
an impeached witness when the consistent statement would weaken
or negate the impeachment by inconsistent statement.' One such
situation occurs when the original impeachment is by a showing of
bias, corruption, or other motive to falsify, and the corroborating
consistent statement is shown to have been made at a time prior to
the existence of the alleged bias, etc. In such cases, the prior consis-
tent statement effectively destroys the force of the impeaching evi-
dence. Another exception is found when the original impeachment
is by prior inconsistent statement (self-contradiction), but the wit-
ness denies ever having made the inconsistent statement. In such a
case, a prior consistent statement is admissible as corroborating the
witness' denial of having uttered the inconsistent statement (not as
corroboration of his trial testimony).'76
D. Motive, Interest, Bias, or Prejudice
1. GENERALLY
Witnesses may be questioned, without need for laying a founda-
tion, regarding their motives, interests, or biases which may reflect
unfavorably upon their credibility. Such matters are not collateral
or immaterial and thus not subject to the rule of collateral limita-
tion.'77 It is therefore proper to inquire on cross-examination as to
whether the witness has been paid by his employer to testify against
the defendant, or if his employer has any interest in the defendant's
prosecution.' A witness who is a victim of a crime may be ques-
174. Davidson v. Eddings, 262 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). Contra, Phillips v. Dow
Chem. Co., 247 Miss. 193, 151 So. 2d 199 (1963). See also Kesmarki v. Kisling, 400 F.2d 97,
102 (6th Cir. 1968).
175. Kellam v. Thomas, 287 So. 2d 733 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
176. Id.
177. See Johnson v. State, 178 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1965); see text accompanying
note 152 for an explanation of the rule.
178. State v. Johnson, 285 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
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tioned also as to whether he has a civil suit pending against the
defendant for the purpose of showing interest in the outcome of the
criminal trial.'79 Recently, the District Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict, rejected a bias impeachment attempt on grounds that the
facts indicating bias were too remote in time, and perhaps place, to
form a basis for impeachment.' Defense counsel attempted to show
that the State's witness had been arrested some 2 years earlier and
that avoidance of charges motivated his decision to testify as an
undercover agent. The prior criminal incident had occurred in an-
other state. Though the impeachment attempt was forbidden, the
court made it clear that if the witness were recently or presently
under actual or threatened prosecution of investigation, then de-
fense counsel would have had an absolute right to expose such cir-
cumstances.
2. MARY CARTER AGREEMENTS
In the notable decision of Ward v. Ochoa, I the Supreme Court
of Florida held that "Mary Carter Agreements"'' 2 are admissible
evidence since they may reflect upon the credibility of testimony of
a party to the agreement. Such agreements can be admitted upon
request by any defendant who stands to lose as a result of the agree-
ment.
An interesting procedural conflict however has arisen concern-
ing "Mary Carter Agreements." During trial, in General Portland
Land Development Co. v. Stevens, 3 although the court required
the production of a suspected "Mary Carter Agreement," it made
clear as part of that order that upon production the agreement
would not be permitted in evidence and disclosed to the jury. How-
ever, it would be marked for identification and made part of the
court record. The plaintiff appealed, claiming the refusal to enter
the agreement into evidence and present it to the jury was error. The
defendant, on appeal, contended no error had occurred since the
179. Bessman v. State, 259 So. 2d 776 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
180. Morrell v. State, 297 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
181. 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973), noted in 28 U. MIAMI L. REv. 988 (1974).
182. A "Mary Carter" agreement is one between a plaintiff and one of the multiple
defendants to the effect that if the agreeing co-owner will conduct its defense so as to increase
the non-agreeing co-defendant's liability, the liability of the agreeing co-owner will be propor-
tionately reduced.
183. 291 So. 2d 250 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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plaintiff never made a formal proffer of the agreement. The District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that, given the trial court's
initial statement that upon production it would not accept the
agreement into evidence, such a proffer would have been clearly
unavailing and therefore a formal proffer was unnecessary to show
error. '
Less than 5 months later, a strikingly similar case again came
before the Fourth District in Parish v. Armstrong.'5 Again, during
trial the plaintiff became suspicious that a "Mary Carter
Agreement" existed and requested its production and admission
into evidence. At the time of that trial, Ward v. Ochoal'5 had not
yet been decided. The trial court refused plaintiff's request to pres-
ent the agreement to the jury. This refusal was cited as error by the
plaintiff on appeal. The defendant claimed that since the plaintiff
never made a formal proffer or otherwise managed to get the agree-
ment into the court record, the admissibility of such an agreement
could not be determined on appeal. The above related facts come
from the dissent. The majority affirmed without opinion.
It is difficult to reconcile Portland and Parish. The only appar-
ent distinction is that in Portland the agreement was made part of
the court record. But as the dissent in Parish points out during
argument over admissibility of the agreement, defendant's counsel
admitted it existed and such admission was sufficient to demon-
strate the gist of the agreement and its admissibility. One can only
speculate as to why the majority acted in such a manner.
E. Character
When a witness takes the stand, he thereby places his credibil-
ity in issue.8 7 Thus, it is proper to attempt to impeach credibility.
However, when the character of the witness forms the basis of the
impeachment, and the witness (usually a criminal defendant) has
not placed his general Character in issue, the only proper object of
184. It appears from the opinion, however, that the plaintiff failed even to formally
object to the trial court's sua sponte statement that while production would be compelled,
the agreement would not be permitted into evidence. In fact, it appears that at the time of
the trial court's statement, the plaintiff acquiesced.
185. 302 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
186. 284 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1973).
187. See Baxter v. State, 294 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 303 So. 2d
26 (Fla. 1974).
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the inquiry is his general reputation in the community for truth and
veracity. 8
Though the distinction may be without measurable differ-
ence,' 9 for purposes of admissibility it is important to distinguish
between an attack based upon general reputation for truth and
veracity and an attack based upon general bad character. While
evidence of a witness' poor reputation for truth and veracity is gen-
erally admissible to impugn credibility once a proper foundation is
set,9 ' evidence of one's bad character is admissible only after the
witness has already introduced evidence of his good character.'9'
VI. OTHER CRIMES
A. Generally
There are three purposes for which evidence of prior crimes or
convictions may be admitted in Florida courts: (1) to impeach the
credibility of a witness; 9 ' (2) to show, in criminal cases, an offense
relevant to a material issue of fact;'93 and (3) to test a character
witness' knowledge of the defendant.9 4
B. Impeachment of Witness' Credibility
1. GENERALLY
The general rule concerning use of prior criminal convictions for
impeachment purposes is supplied by section 90.08 of the Florida
Statutes.' Under the statute, only the fact of conviction is admissi-
188. Id. The trend is to define "community" broadly to mean any place in which the
person to be impeached is well known. See Hamilton v. State, 129 Fla. 219, 176 So. 89 (1937).
189. See Baxter v. State, 294 So. 2d 392, 394 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974) (Waldin, J., dissent-
ing).
190. Sherwood v. State, 271 So.2d 21 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972). The following foundation is
generally considered sufficient:
Q. Do you know John Jones' present general reputation for truth and veracity
in the community in which he lives (or works)?
A. Yes.
Q. What is his reputation?
A. Bad.
If the response to the first question is negative, the witness is not qualified to give reputation
testimony.
191. See Andrews v. State, 172 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1965).
192. See Section VI, B infra.
193. See Section VI, C infra.
194. See Section VI, D infra.
195. FLA. STAT. § 90.08 (1973) provides in pertinent part:
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ble, and the nature of the specific crime may not be indicated.
Furthermore, there must have been an express adjudication of guilt
by the court, 9 ' and mere evidence of a criminal offense without a
conviction does not fall within section 90.08.11
Although the conviction may be for either a felony or misde-
meanor under state law,' the District Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict, has held that a conviction by a summary court-martial is not
a conviction within the meaning of section 90.08.11
2. PROCEDURE
Once the conviction and crime are held to be admissible, there
are specific limits to the questioning which may take place.2 °° The
witness, including a defendant who elects to testify, may be asked
whether he has ever been convicted of a crime, and if so, how many
times. If the witness admits having been convicted, and truthfully
answers as to the number of convictions, then the inquiry must
cease, and the particular crime cannot be indicated unless it was
perjury.20' If, on the other hand, the witness denies any previous
convictions, the opposing party may produce the record of such
convictions. 02 The witness may at this time, or on redirect examina-
tion, explain the nature of the crime or cite other relevant facts in
an attempt to rebut any adverse implications.03
Evidence of [conviction of any crime], including the fact that the prior convic-
tion was for the crime of perjury, may be given to affect the credibility of the said
witness, and such conviction may be proved by questioning the proposed witness,
or, if he deny it, by producing a record of his convictions ...
As for impeaching a witness in Florida, See Section V supra.
196. Weathers v. State, 56 So. 2d 536 (Fla. 1952).
197. Braswell v. State, 306 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975); Statewrights v. State, 278
So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973), quashed, 300 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1974); Note, 15 U. FLA. L. REV.
220 (1962); see Note, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 168 (1968).
198. See Hendrick v. Strazzulla, 135 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1961); Roe v. State, 96 Fla. 723, 119
So. 118 (1928). Evidence of prior juvenile court adjudications are inadmissible since they are
not "convictions." FLA. STAT. § 39.10(4) (1973).
199. Braswell v. State, 306 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975). The court was concerned with
a 1948 summary court-martial conviction. The court expressly left open the question of
whether a general court-martial "conviction" would come within FLA. STAT. § 90.08 (1973).
200. Jones v. State, 305 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975); Whitehead v. State, 279 So. 2d
99 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1983).
201. FLA. STAT. § 90.08 (1973).
202. Lockwood v. State, 107 So. 2d 770 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1958). Wise counsel, upon examin-
ing the record, should stipulate to the conviction in order to prevent such exposure.
203. See Noeling v. State, 40 So. 2d 120 (Fla. 1949).
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In State v. Young,204 the defendant witness acknowledged that
he had been convicted but stated that this had happened only once.
In this circumstance, the State was found not to be acting impro-
perly by asking further questions as to whether the witness had been
convicted of other specifically mentioned crimes since it did so on
the premise of refreshing the witness' memory. The line of question-
ing used was clearly prejudicial under both section 90.08 and the
case law interpreting it. However, the District Court of Appeal, First
District, did not consider either that contrary to the statute, the
specific crimes were named, or that such information was highly
prejudicial even though the issues were before the court. Instead,
the court reasoned that a witness may be questioned as to the num-
ber of his previous convictions, and that the state may properly
refresh his memory so that the witness may correct his testimony
or deny other convictions. The court then relied on the protective
mantle of the harmless error rule. When compared to section 90.08,
the Young case appears to have been incorrectly reasoned. Once the
defendant replied that he had been convicted on only one previous
occasion, the proper procedure for the State to follow would have
been to submit an admissible record of convictions-not to orally
suggest that other specific convictions had occurred.
A similarly liberal interpretation of section 90.08 was offered by
the Supreme Court of Florida in Warren v. State.' At trial, on
cross-examination of the defendant regarding prior convictions, re-
peated suggestions were made by the prosecution, in the form of
questions, that the defendant had been convicted of a felony despite
the defendant's denials. When defense counsel indicated the prose-
cution was relying on an FBI "rap sheet," and not an admissible
record of conviction, the trial court instructed the jury to disregard
the questioning concerning defendant's prior conviction. Neverthe-
less, the jury convicted the defendant and he was sentenced to
death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida held that the
prompt instruction to the jury, and the fact that the last impression
came from the defendant and indicated no conviction, rendered any
prejudice harmless error.
Stricter adherence to section 90.08 is illustrated by the recent
case of Jones v. State.06 In Jones, on direct examination the defen-
204. 283 So.2d 58 (Fla. lst Dist. 1973), cert. denied, 290 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 1974).
205. 270 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1972).
206. 305 So. 2d 827 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
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dant testified that he had three prior convictions, but later revised
his testimony to indicate only one prior conviction. On cross-
examination, the defendant was questioned regarding this discrep-
ancy and explained that he had been convicted of escape three or
four times. The prosecutor then asked if the defendant had ever
been convicted of armed robbery. Although the defendant's motion
for mistrial was denied, the court instructed the jury to disregard
the questions concerning prior convictions. On appeal, the District
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed and remanded for a new
trial on the grounds that the inquiry was clearly improper and the
prejudicial impact could not have been removed by the trial court's
instruction to the jury.
The District Court of Appeal, First District, has significantly
altered the procedure under section 90.08 by imposing a new limita-
tion on impeachment by way of prior conviction. In Braswell v.
State,0 7 the court decided not only that a military summary court-
martial is not a conviction within the meaning of section 90.08, but
further that in order for a conviction to be admissible under that
statute the crime must not have been so remote in time as to
have no appreciable bearing on the witness' present credibility
where there is nothing in the record to show that the witness has
not reformed." 8
The issue of what length of time constitutes remoteness was left
within the sound discretion of the trial judge to be determined in
light of the circumstances surrounding the particular conviction
sought to be shown.
C. Relevance to Fact in Issue
1. GENERALLY
As a general rule, evidence of other crimes is inadmissible to
prove either bad character or propensity of a party for criminal
conduct. However, such evidence is admissible if offered: (1) to
prove identity; (2) to show a continuing scheme or plan of which the
present crime is a part; (3) to prove intent; (4) to establish a motive;
(5) to disprove entrapment; or (6) to show the context of the crime
207. 306 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
208. Id. at 613.
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charged."0 9 In 1959 in the landmark case of Williams v. State',' the
Supreme Court of Florida announced its departure from the general
exclusionary rule, with its many exceptions, in favor of a general
rule of admissibility based on relevancy. If such evidence is relevant
for any purpose save that of showing bad character or propensity,
it should be admitted.
A liberal reading of Williams suggests a significant broadening
in the use of evidence of other crimes and a policy favoring admissi-
bility of highly prejudicial evidence upon a showing of relevance.'"
However, in practice the difference has been one of labels only; the
courts have merely utilized the previous "exceptions" as the mea-
sure of relevancy."'
Recently, the Supreme Court of Florida indicated a more re-
strictive attitude toward application of the Williams rule. In
McGough v. State"' the court held inadmissible evidence of other
crimes which are remote in time. Though relevancy is the test under
the Williams rule, the time factor is a part of the test for relevancy.
In addition, the court held inadmissible evidence concerning crimi-
nal events which had occurred 4 years prior to the charged offense.
The court left further refinement of the outer limits of "remoteness"
for subsequent case-by-case analysis.
Another limitation on the Williams rule is that evidence of
other crimes, even though relevant, may not be used to excess.1
One court had held that even though almost conclusive evidence of
defendant's guilt was shown, an overzealous prosecutor committed
prejudicial error in parading before the jury a full review of the
defendant's criminal conduct, thus transforming a criminal trial
into a mere sideshow. 215
Under present procedures, once relevancy is shown, evidence of
a collateral crime is admissible upon clear and convincing proof of
209. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 190.
210. 110 So. 2d 654 (Fla. 1959). See Green v. State, 190 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966)
for an excellent interpretation of Williams.
211. See Franklin v. State, 229 So. 2d 892, 893-94 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
212. See Alford v. State, 307 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1975); Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla.
1972); Green v. State, 190 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1966).
213. 302 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1974); cf. State v. Statewright, 300 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1974).
214. See State v. Davis, 290 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1974); Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla.
1972); Denson v. State, 264 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
215. Denson v. State, 264 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972). Chief Judge Spector, in his
dissenting opinion contended that there is no merit in reversing where there is conclusive
evidence of guilt as to the crime charged.
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a connection between the defendant and the collateral
occurrences."'6 That the defendant committed the collateral offense
need not be proven beyond reasonable doubt, but mere suspicion of
such fact is inadequate; the other crime's connection with the ac-
cused and with the offense being prosecuted must be established by
clear and convincing proof or by the making of a prima facie case."7
Once this burden is met it is of little consequence whether the other
crime was committed prior or subsequent to the one being prose-
cuted"'8 or whether the defendant was, in fact, merely accused but
never arrested. 19
Relevant evidence of other crimes does not become inadmissi-
ble solely because the defendant was acquitted of the other crime.2 '
Though this is presently the majority view, it has recently been
subjected to close scrutiny. Thus, in Lawson v. State,2 ' the District
Court of Appeal, Third District, indicated its concern "with the
prosecution's sometimes stubborn determination to introduce evi-
dence of collateral crimes where relevance at best is borderline.""22
As an aid in stemming reliance on such testimony, the court decided
that there must be an even stronger showing of relevance where the
prosecution intends to use evidence of another crime for which the
defendant was acquitted.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit intro-
duced a constitutional dimension to the prior acquittal problem. 23
Based on the principles of collateral estoppel and double jeopardy,
as espoused in Ashe v. Swenson, 4 the Fifth Circuit concluded that
the prosecution is constitutionally precluded from introducing, at a
subsequent trial for a different crime, evidence of other crimes of
216. Rehms v. State, 279 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 1973). See also Whitehead v. State, 279 So.
2d 99 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
217. Parnell v. State, 218 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1969).
218. Webber v. State, 305 So.2d 235 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); Ashley v. State, 265 So.2d 685
(Fla. 1972).
219. State v. Statewright, 300 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1974); Banks v. State, 298 So. 2d 543 (Fla.
1st Dist. 1974); Rodriquez v. State, 281 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
220. Lawson v. State, 304 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Blackburn v. State, 208 So.
2d 625 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1968).
221. 304 So.2d 522 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
222. Id. at 523. Under present law, defendant may introduce evidence of his acquittal,
but must do so by submitting the court record. Chippas v. State, 194 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1967).
223. Wingate v. Wainwright, 464 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1972).
224. 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
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which the defendant had been acquitted."' At the present time, the
Florida courts appear to be resisting this decision."'
2. IDENTITY
Evidence of other crimes is admissible to cast light upon the
character of the act under investigation by showing the identify of
the accused. 7 However, the identity of the accused must be a mate-
rial fact at issue." Furthermore, it should be required that such
evidence be necessary; that is, there is not ample proof of identity
without evidence of other crimes. 2 9
Identify is often shown through proof of other "signature"
crimes or a modus operandi which earmarks the handiwork of the
defendant. In such situations the other crime must be both similar
in class and distinctiveness to the one being prosecuted. 3 ' Mere
repeated commission of crimes of the same class, such as repeated
robberies or thefts, is insufficient. 31
In Davis v. State, 32 two witnesses testified that the defendant
had committed another crime of the same class as the one
charged-robbery. The testimony revealed that in commission of a
food store robbery the defendant was disguised in a pair of women's
bikini panties worn as a mask, with a blue sock on his right hand
and a kitchen towel over his left hand. However, no such modus
operandi was involved in the crime for which the defendant was on
trial. Admission of this unrelated "other crime" evidence consti-
tuted reversible error.
225. See also Johnson v. State, 285 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973) (Rawls, C.J., dissent-
ing). For further discussion, see Expanding Double Jeopardy: Collateral Estoppel and the
Evidentiary Use of Prior Crimes for which the Defendant Has Been Acquitted, 2 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 511 (1974).
226. Blackburn v. State, 286 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); Davis v. State, 277 So. 2d
311 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973), a/f'd, 290 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1974); State v. Fisher, 264 So. 2d 857 (Fla.
3d Dist. 1972); Note, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 511, 531-32 (1974). See also United States v.
Addington, 471 F.2d 560, 567 n.5 (10th Cir. 1973).
227. Ashley v. State, 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972).
228. See, e.g., Alston v. State, 297 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
229. See, e.g., Drayton v. State, 292 So. 2d 395 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). But see Gordan v.
State, 288 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
230. E.g., Beasley v. State, 305 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Drayton v. State, 292
So. 2d 395 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
231. Davis v. State, 276 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973), aff'd, 290 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1974).
See also Braer v. State, 302 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); Golphin v. State, 293 So. 2d 755
(Fla. 2d Dist. 1974); Drayton v. State, 292 So. 395 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Dinkens v. State, 291
So. 2d 122 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
232. 276 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973), aff'd, 290 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1974).
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In Beasley v. State,233 the defendant was convicted in the lower
court of breaking and entering with intent to commit grand larceny
and of committing grand larceny. During the trial, the State pre-
sented evidence of two collateral break-ins. In reversing the lower
court, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the
State had produced evidence tending to show a "'[m]ere similarity
of offenses without regard to the singular manner of this perpetra-
tion.' '"34
A more liberal application of the Williams rule is the decision
in Ashley v. State.35 Defendant was charged with five murders-one
of a hitchhiker and the other four occurring in a restaurant approxi-
mately 1 hour after the murder of the hitchhiker. The restaurant
murders were consolidated in one trial, and the hitchhiker case was
tried at a later date. The defendant's accomplice gave eyewitness
testimony at both trials. Further evidence of the defendant's oral
confession was introduced. Convictions resulted at both trials, and
the defendant received the death penalty.
In his appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida the defendant
contended that the trial court committed error in the second trial
(for the murder of the hitchhiker) by permitting evidence of the
commission of the restraurant murders for which he had been con-
victed earlier. The pertinent evidence concerned the identical na-
ture of the bullets removed from the five victims, and the fact that
all had been fired from the same gun.
After recital of the Williams rule the court concluded that the
evidence was proper, bearing upon the issues of motive, intent,
identity, and modus operandi.133 It would appear, however, that
these elements of the crime were not at issue. Since the State had
eye-witness testimony which identified the defendant as the culprit
as well as the defendant's confession, there was ample proof of the
crime without resort to evidence of the companion crime.
3. MOTIVE
Evidence of collateral crimes is admissible to show motive for
233. 305 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
234. Id. at 286, quoting Duncan v. State, 291 So. 2d 241 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
235. 265 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 1972).
236. The court also relied on the fact that the defendant's own attorney had brought up
the defendant's prior conviction, in his voir dire examination.
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the crime charged. In State v. Statewright,137 the State contended
that the motive for murder was the defendant's fear that his victim
would publicly reveal the defendant's homosexuality. During its
trial presentation the State attempted to elicit testimony concern-
ing the defendant's sexual reputation. Although such a probe was
improper,2 31 the defense failed to object. The defendant, testifying
on his own behalf, and again on cross-examination, denied being a
homosexual, and denied having performed an unnatural sex act 5
years previously. He also alleged self-defense in the killing. In rebut-
tal, the State called a police officer who testified that he had ar-
rested the defendant in 1961 on a charge of performing an unnatural
sex act. The defendant was convicted.
The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed on the
ground, inter alia, that the prior sexual offense was a collateral and
irrelevant matter and therefore the state was bound by the answers
given by the accused. On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court of
Florida held that the evidence of the prior arrest and crime was
relevant to show motive and premediation for the murder, and was
admissible into evidence.
In Alford v. State,3 ' the defendant was convicted of the rape
and murder of a 13 year-old female. In his appeal the defendant
argued that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that he and
another man had attempted a homosexual act immediately prior to
the commission of the crime charged. The prosecution claimed the
evidence was relevant to show the defendant's state of mind and
motive immediately prior to the rape and murder. Relying in part
upon Statewright, the court agreed that sexual frustration arising
from the earlier unsuccessful encounter was relevant to show motive
for the subsequent rape and murder.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, has held that
where there is otherwise ample evidence of a defendant's motive,
detailed testimony of a collateral offense which tends to establish
motive should not be permitted.240
237. 300 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1974), quashing 278 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). Presuma-
bly, the decision in Statewright would fall under the remoteness rule later announced in
McGough v. State, 302 So. 2d 751 (Fla. 1974).
238. The state cannot attack an accused's character unless the accused first puts it in
issue. However, no reversible error occurs unless the error is preserved by an objection. State
v. Jones, 204 So. 2d 515 (Fla. 1967).
239. 307 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1975).




If the other crime is a part of the same transaction, or is neces-
sarily involved in an explanation of the crime charged, or is required
to complete the story of the crime charged by proving the immediate
context, it is generally held to be relevant and admissible.2", Thus,
evidence indicating that a defendant committed another robbery
immediately prior to, and as a part of, the same series of incidents
comprising the robbery charged is admissible."'
However, the other crime must have some connection or mate-
rial bearing on the crime charged. In Mason v. State,243 the defen-
dant was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape. At trial
the prosecutor introduced into evidence a wallet and newspaper
clipping found at the scene of the crime. The newspaper clipping
stated that defendant had been acquitted of a similar assault in
another state. Reversing and remanding for a new trial, the court
declared the clipping was not part of the res gestae, and had no
relevant bearing on the crime charged, other than to show bad char-
acter. It appears that in order to be part of the res gestae the prior
crime must be committed in close temporal proximity to the crime
being prosecuted."'
VII. DEAD MAN'S STATUTE
The dead man's statute45 bars the testimony of an interested
person regarding transactions and communications between that
person and another, who at the time of trial is deceased. The ration-
ale of the rule is that in controversies over contracts or other trans-
actions where one party to the transaction has died and others
survive, fraud and hardship would result if the living persons were
permitted to testify in their own behalf concerning the transaction.
The threshold question for the application of the statute to
disqualify a person from testifying is whether the witness is an inter-
ested person. In Clark v. Grimsley,46 two surviving daughters of the
deceased challenged a will on the ground of undue influence. The
241. Gordan v. State, 288 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974); Homer v. State 149 So. 2d
863 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1963). See section XII, D for discussion of hearsay.
242. Kinchen v. State, 297 So. 2d 341 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
243. 286 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
244. See Gordan v. State, 288 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
245. FLA. STAT. § 90.05 (1973).
246. 270 So. 2d 53 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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will devised the testatrix' entire estate to a third daughter. The
witness, a sister-in-law of one of the daughters contesting the will,
was allowed to authenticate certain letters as being in the testatrix'
handwriting. The court held that the witness was in no way an
interested person under the statute since she as an individual did
not stand to gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of
the judgment.
Application of the statute is restricted by its own terms in cases
where the decedent's testimony is offered into evidence, for exam-
ple, by prior deposition. In such a case a surviving party can give
testimony which would otherwise be inadmissible under the stat-
ute. 247
Note, however, that a party can lose the protection of the stat-
ute by waiver. In Robinson v. Miller,45 the issue arose whether the
defendants had paid a certain sum to the plaintiff's deceased hus-
band. On direct examination, one of the defendants testified that
he had paid the money to the decedent. Plaintiff's counsel did not
object, but rather cross-examined the defendant on this point.
When the defendant reiterated his statement concerning payment
on redirect, however, plaintiff's counsel objected on grounds of vio-
lation of the dead man's statute. The trial court found no waiver and
sustained the objection. But on appeal, the District Court of Ap-
peal, Second District, held that the initial failure to object and
subsequent cross-examination constituted a waiver of the protec-
tions of the dead man rule. The court further held that the waiver
of the statute by the plaintiff should apply equally to each of the
defendants involved, and was applicable to subsequent proceedings
upon remand of the case.
Since the statute's protection can be waived, a pretrial order
excluding testimony relating to certain subjects by the defendant
and all other persons interested in the case has been held erroneous
as premature.249 However, a party's waiver of the dead man's statute
concerning a particular transaction does not constitute a waiver
concerning a permissive counterclaim where a separate transaction
is at issue, although the same decedent is involved.8 0 Thus, where
247. Cohen v. Glickman, 300 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974). Note that FLA. R. Civ. P.
1.330 (a)(3) allows the use of a witness' deposition for any purpose if the court finds that the
witness is deceased.
248. 296 So. 2d 58 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
249. Wallace v. Gilbert, 250 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
250. Grayson v. Fishlove, 266 So, 2d 38 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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D's executor sues A for payment of a debt to D, and the executor
waives the dead man rule, the statute's protection still exists for the




The doctrine of judicial notice is one of great potential useful-
ness, but courts have been cautious in its application.25' The effect
of judicial notice is to permit courts to take cognizance of certain
facts without requiring formal proof.
Generally, the types of facts judicially noticed fall into one of
two categories: (1) matters within the common knowledge of reason-
ably informed people; 52 and (2) matters of official record.2"3 There
has been some recognition of a trend toward the establishment of a
third category, falling between the other two and comprised of those
matters which are "verifiably certain by reference to competent,
authoritative sources." '54
B. Matters of Common Knowledge
During the survey period, courts have taken judicial notice of
the widespread use of television antennae,25 the "summary" nature
of summary court-martial proceedings during and immediately fol-
lowing World War 1I,256 the fact that a "submachine"gun may be
hand held as distinguished from a machine gun on a mount resting
on the ground,257 the respective characteristics and properties of
screens and glass jalousies,5 s the inflationary trends of recent
251. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 328.
252. See Makos v. Prince, 64 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1953); MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 329.
253. Makos v. Prince, 64 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1953). Florida has adopted the Uniform Notice
of Foreign Law Act, FLA. STAT. § 92.031 (1973).
254. Freimuth v. State, 272 So. 2d 473, 477 (Fla. 1972); Yellow Cab Co. v. Broward
County, 282 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). As to a nebulous fourth category of "legislative
facts," compare MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 331 with, Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla.
1972).
255. Brown v. City of Vero Beach, 271 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972), cert. denied, 275
So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1973).
256. Braswell v. State, 306 So. 2d 609 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
257. Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972).
258. Sterling Village Condominium, Inc. v. Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d 685 (Fla. 4th Dist.),
cert. denied, 254 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1971).
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years,"'9 and the fact that the word "pig" has in recent times come
to be used as a derisive name for police. 6 '
On the other hand, courts have refused to judically notice
whether a "class" is of sufficient number for purposes of a class
action, 6' and whether the primary business of a beauty salon is the
sale of merchandise of a cosmetic nature or the providing of a service
in order to determine the application of bulk sales laws.6 '
C. Matters of Official Record
1. MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES
In Holmes v. State,2"' the Supreme Court of Florida overruled
the previous rule6 4 that municipal ordinances must be specifically
pleaded and proven. Trial courts may now take judicial notice of a
municipal ordinance which they are called upon to enforce. This
places municipal ordinances more in line with the treatment af-
forded to private laws, statutes of sister states, and the laws of
foreign countries. 5
2. ADMINISTRATIVE RULES AND REGULATIONS
The court has also receded from its position that an authenti-
cated copy of an official administrative rule or regulation of a state
or federal agency adopted pursuant to law must be introduced be-
fore a court may take judicial notice of the particular rule or regula-
tion."' Courts may now take judicial notice of official records of
administrative agencies without the introduction of an authenti-
cated copy."'
259. Whidden v. Division of Administration, 281 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
260. City of St. Petersburg v. Waller, 261 So. 2d 151 (Fla.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989
(1972).
261. Harrell v. Hess Oil & Chem. Corp., 287 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1973). The court, in a class
action brought by owners of property bordering on a creek for damages due to alleged pollu-
tion, refused to take notice of the fact that number of such "plaintiffs" was too large for all
to be joined in one suit. Thus, unlike the cases cited in notes 252-257 supra, Harrell involved
a question of law to be determined on the basis of evidence introduced at the preliminary
hearing.
262. Yarbrough v. Rogers, 300 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
263. 273 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1973), noted in 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 811 (1973).
264. Freeman v. State, 19 Fla. 552 (1882).
265. See FLA. STAT § 92.01 (1973).
266. See Mobley v. State, 143 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1962).




The courts of Florida will not take judicial notice of the con-
tents of the record of a separate and distinct case, even if pending
or disposed of in the same court.26 The appropriate method of proof
of such facts is to introduce the court file of the other case, or a
certified copy thereof, into evidence. 9
However, a court may take judicial notice of its own files. State
v. Hinton270 involved a motion to suppress evidence alleged to have
been seized illegally. The court held that it could judicially notice
that its own file in the cause contained no search warrant, thus
shifting the burden to the State to sustain the validity of the
search."'
IX. PRESUMPTIONS
In Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Fruchter,72 the supreme court
cautioned the trial courts against instructing juries on presump-
tions. Matters of presumption arising from the evidence are usually
for the court in determining whether or not there is a sufficient basis
for submitting the case to a jury as a matter of law. If a prima facie
case is made out, then the jury should be allowed to weigh the
evidence free of any "presumption" instruction.
Among the presumptions recognized during the survey period
are presumptions that all men are sane," 3 that the directors of a
corporation act honestly and in the best interests of the stockholders
in the sale of corporate assets,' and that public officials properly
perform the duties of their office." 5
268. Mennella Plastering, Inc. v. Adobe Brick & Supply Co., 273 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
However, the court found such procedure,in the absence of a showing of prejudice, to be
harmless error.
269. Bergeron Land Dev., Inc. v. Knight, 307 So. 2d 240 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975); Truxell v.
Truxell, 259 So. 2d 766 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
270. 305 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1975).
271. Id. at 807. See Megdell v. Adeff, 296 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), in which the
court declared that the trial judge should have taken judicial notice of the "uncertainty"
created in a case due to reassignment from one judge to another for purposes of ruling on a
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
272. 283 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1973).
273. Byrd v. State, 297 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1974); Cook v. State, 271 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 2d Dist.
1973).
274. De La Rosa v. Tropical Sandwiches, Inc., 298 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), cert.
denied, 312 So. 2d 760 (1975).
275. Askew v. Taylor, 299 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974); Yonge v. Askew, 293 So. 2d
395 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
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In Milros-Sans Souci, Inc. v. Dade County,"'6 a taxpayer argued
that proof of general office practice and course of conduct in the tax
assessor's office was insufficient to establish that notice of a tax
assessment increase reached the taxpayer by mail. The case in-
volved the familiar presumption that when mail has been properly
addressed, stamped, and mailed pursuant to normal office proce-
dure, the mail has been received by the addressee.277 The court held
that the taxpayer, by merely denying receipt of the notice of in-
crease in assessment, could not overcome that presumption. The
court noted that to expect the county to prove evidence of mailing
specific assessment increases would be to impose an unreasonable
burden.
The effect of a conclusive presumption is that no evidence may
be introduced to rebut the presumption. Such presumptions have
been adopted as a matter of social policy. Thus, in Tappan v.
State,27 a bank was conclusively charged with knowledge of its re-
cords. The conclusive presumption that a child under 6 years of age
is incapable of being contributorily negligent was noted in dicta in
Harrold v. Schluep.275
X. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Generally, state administrative agencies are not bound by the
technical rules of evidence followed in the courts."' Relevant stat-
utes prescribe evidentiary standards applicable in agency proceed-
ings and in judicial review of such proceedings."'
In essence, section 120.58 of the Florida Administrative Proce-
dure Act of 1975282 provides the following rules. All relevant,
material, and noncumulative evidence which reasonably prudent
men would rely upon in the conduct of their affairs shall be admissi-
ble in agency proceedings. Hearsay, not supplementary or explana-
276. 296 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974), cert. denied, 310 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1975).
277. Brown v. Griffen Indus., Inc., 281 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 1973).
278. 277 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
279. 264 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
280. FLA. STAT. § 120.58 (Supp. 1974).
281. See Jones v. City of Hialeah, 294 So. 2d 686 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Florida Dep't of
Health & Rehabilitative Services v. Career Serv. Comm'n, 289 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 4th Dist.
1974).
282. For a detailed discussion of the Florida Administrative Procedure Act, see Levinson,
The Florida Administrative Procedure Act: 1974 Revision and 1975 Amendments, 29 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 619 (1975).
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tory of other admissible evidence, is inadmissible by itself unless it
comes within a particular exception recognized in civil actions. Cop-
ies or excerpts are admissible as documentary evidence if the origi-
nal is not readily available. Cross-examination is expressly permit-
ted whenever testimony or documents are made part of the record.
Of significant evidentiary import are three recent decisions of
the Supreme Court of Florida. In Buchman v. State Board of
Accountancy,283 Kozerowitz v. Florida Real Estate Commission284
and State ex rel. Vining v. Florida Real Estate Commission,285 the
court extended the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination to administrative proceedings penal in nature, e.g.,
license revocations or suspensions. These cases raise the question of
the future scope and applicability of constitutional safeguards, tra-




Demonstrative evidence is that which "can convey a relevant
firsthand sense impression to the trier of fact, as opposed to
[evidence] which serve[s] merely to report the secondhand sense
impressions of others." ' For example, the photograph of a scene," 7
as opposed to a witness' description of the scene, constitutes
demonstrative evidence.
Demonstrative evidence may be inadmissible because it fails to
convey any definite information. A tape recording purportedly re-
producing a bribe was held inadmissible due to its poor quality since
admitting the tape would have prejudiced the defendant by possibly
causing the jury to speculate on the basis of those portions which
were intelligible.8 '
283. 300 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1974).
284. 289 So. 2d 391 (Fla. 1974).
285. 281 So. 2d 487 (Fla. 1974).
286. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 212.
287. See Mullard v. State, 280 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973); Seibels, Bruce & Co. v.
Giddings, 264 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 269 So. 2d 370 (Fla. 1972).
288. Carter v. State, 254 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 257 So. 2d 260
(Fla. 1972). See also Scaldefeim v. State, 294 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 3d Dist.), cert. denied, 303 So.
2d 21 (Fla. 1974), 419 U.S. 993 (1975).
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B. Photographs
Photographs may be admitted through a witness who testifies
that they correctly and accurately portray the facts represented.
The witness need not be the photographer nor a person familiar with
camera mechanisms."' Such testimony would go to the weight given
to the photographs as evidence, not to their admissibility. 9
Photographs are admissible, although not taken at the time of
the event in question, if the authenticating witness testifies that
they accurately depict the event when it occurred. In State Depart-
ment of Public Works v. Manning,2"' a motorist brought an action
against the department for negligent maintenance of its highways.
The department had introduced a witness, one of its employees, who
testified that there were no defects in the shoulder of the road when
he left the job site on the previous day. The plaintiff submitted
photographs taken 2 days after her accident which showed a sub-
stantial drop-off between the paved highway and its unpaved shoul-
der. The department objected, claiming that the drop-off had been
deepened when cars drove around plaintiff's wreck. The photo-
graphs were nevertheless admitted on the testimony of an investi-
gating officer who stated that they accurately depicted the drop-off
immediately after the accident. Apparently, the objecting party
may not exclude photographs merely by presenting witnesses who
contradict the testimony of the authenticating witness.
The presence of the authenticating witness at the scene de-
picted by the photographs may not be necessary. In a prosecution
for passing a forged check, a "Regiscope" photograph taken during
the check cashing was properly admitted through the
complementary testimony of the two witnesses.292 The store em-
ployee who had cashed the check and operated the "Regiscope"
testified that she recognized the check and that the photo accur-
ately represented the check and the customer I.D. card. She could
not, however, say that the photo accurately represented the person
standing before her when she took it. The defendant's former em-
289. See Oja v. State, 292 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
290. State Dep't of Transp. v. Manning, 288 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 2d Dist.), cert. denied, 295
So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1974).
291. Id.
292. Oja v. State, 292 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974). The same rule is applied to "Regi-
scope" photos as to other photographs. They must be verified by someone having knowledge
of what is depicted.
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ployer, not present when the check was cashed, identified the check
as a company check, identified the person in the photo as the de-
fendant, and, going beyond the testimony of the store employee,
stated that the photo accurately depicted the defendant's appear-
ance at the time of the incident.
A highly controversial use of photographs occurs in murder
prosecutions, where the state offers photographs of the deceased.
The inflammatory effect on jurors which can be caused by the dis-
play of such pictures is obvious, particularly when the photos are
gory. The Supreme Court of Florida has on occasion encouraged this
practice. In Mardoff v. State9' they stated, "the defendant could
not complain because of [the photograph's] shocking nature when
the horrible scene disclosed was one which he, himself, created."
In State v. Wright,"9 4 the court stated its current position that
allegedly gruesome and inflamatory photographs are admissible
into evidence if relevant to any issue required to be proven in a case.
The rule has been liberally applied to admit photographs which
portrayed the setting of an armed robbery and shooting,295
established the identity of a murder victim,"'6 and depicted the
wounds of the deceased.297 Photographs have also been admitted by
the supreme court for use in connection with testimony regarding
the cause of death, and to refute a defendant's claim of self-
defense.298 Thus, in Henninger v. State9 the supreme court deemed
properly admitted three enlarged color photographs showing the
murder victim in various positions with knife wounds in her back,
and with her head partially severed from her body.
To the contrary, the Supreme Court of Florida in Alford v.
State,3" noted in dictum that such photos may be excluded as in-
flammatory.
Once it has been established that the photographs are relevant,
it must then be determined whether the gruesomeness of the
portroyals is so inflamatory as to create an undue prejudice in the
293. 143 Fla. 64, 196 So. 2d 625 (1940).
294. 265 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1972); accord, Bauldree v. State, 284 So. 2d 196 (Fla. 1973).
295. Pressley v. State, 261 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
296. State v. Wright, 265 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1972).
297. Id.
298. Henninger v. State, 251 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1971).
299. 251 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 1971).
300. 307 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1975).
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minds of the jury, and thereby overcomes the value of their rele-
vancy.301'
In Beagles v. State,3'" a murder prosecution, the defendant
admitted "the victim's death, how her death occurred, her identity,
and that a bullet went into her brain and did not come out. .. .
The trial court nevertheless admitted 15 color photographs of the
victim after her body was removed from its shallow grave, 10 of
them taken of the body after it had been taken from the scene.
Many were unquestionably gory and gruesome. The defendant was
subsequently convicted. On appeal, the District Court of Appeal,
First District, reversed, holding that since the defendant had made
so many admissions in the trial court, "there was no fact or circum-
stance in issue which necessitated or justified the admission of the
numerous gruesome photographs in question.
34
C. Handwriting Samples
Handwriting samples, like other demonstrative evidence, must
be properly authenticated. In Clark v. Grimsley, °5 a revocation of
will proceeding, the court admitted a sample of the handwriting of
the testatrix since it was authenticated by a disinterested witness
who was familiar with her handwriting. Since the witness visited the
testatrix weekly, shopped for her, and saw her handwriting often,
the court stated that the witness was sufficiently familiar with the
handwriting to authenticate the proffered sample.
Pate v. Mellen'"' limits the discretion of a trial judge to exclude
handwriting samples sought to be introduced under Florida Stat-
utes section 92.38 (1973).307 The central issue in Pate concerned the
validity of gifts allegedly made to the defendant by a deceased
donor. To establish the validity of the decedent's signature, by com-
301. Id. at 440.
302. 273 So. 2d 796 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
303. Id. at 799.
304. Id.
305. 270 So. 2d 53 (Fla. lst Dist. 1972).
306. 275 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1973).
307. FLA. STAT. § 92.38 (1973) states:
Comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of
the judge to be genuine, shall be permitted to be made by the witnesses; and such
writings, and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same, may be submitted
to the jury, or to the court in case of a trial by the court, as evidence of the
genuineness, or otherwise, of the writing in dispute.
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parison, the defendant-donee proffered numerous checks, purport-
edly signed by the decedent and testified that she had witnessed the
signing of each. This testimony was unrebutted and unquestioned.
Still, the trial court refused to admit the checks without verifi-
cation by another witness. The District Court of Appeal, First Dis-
trict, held that absent any question of the authenticity of the checks
the lower court had abused its discretion in refusing to admit them
as exemplars.
XII. HEARSAY
A. State of Mind
Legal issues often depend on the existence of a particular state
of mind. When statements are offered to prove a state of mind, a
distinction should be made between statements which are offered
to prove circumstantially the state of mind of the declarant and
those statements which seek to prove it directly. For example, to
prove the state of mind of depression, a circumstantial statement
would be "I want to die"; a direct statement would be "I am de-
pressed." The former is not hearsay while the latter falls under a
hearsay exception. 08 However, some Florida courts have ignored
this distinction and lumped both types of statements together.
In Allen Morris Co. v. McNally,' 9 the court upheld the admis-
sion of testimony of two witnesses as to the voluntary statements
made by the plaintiff concerning her pain and suffering which re-
sulted from an automobile accident. The plaintiff's statements,
made while she was in the hospital, were being offered to establish
her mental and emotional condition. The court did not decide
whether it was necessary to examine the nature of the statements
and assess whether they were direct or circumstantial evidence. The
court simply stated that the statements were exceptions to the hear-
say rule and were admissible.
Nonetheless, this exception to the hearsay rule, which has been
particularly significant in the use of the defense of entrapment, has
not always been confused. In Brown v. State,"' the defendant was
convicted of the delivery of heroin to a police officer and an inform-
ant. The defendant pleaded entrapment, but the trial court refused
308. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 294 at 694.
309. 305 So. 2d 79 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
310. 299 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
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to allow evidence of conversations between the defendant and the
informant. The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reversed,
and held that the conversations were admissible as non-hearsay,
rather than as a hearsay exception, since they were not being intro-
duced for the truth of the matter asserted, but to establish the
defendant's state of mind which is basic to the defense of entrap-
ment.
Despite the existence of the conceptual distinction, in practice
it would seem that no actual harm is done by confusing the two
situations since in both cases the testimony is admissible.
B. Business Records
The increased probability of trustworthiness, which is the basic
rationale for permiting business records into evidence, is governed
by Florida Statutes section 92.36 (2) (1973). '11
The court in National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Holland,"
upheld the lower court's refusal to allow introduction into evidence
of a document entitled "doctor's certificate" signed by a doctor who
was not present to testify. The certificate was offered to prove the
physical health of a driver at the time of an accident. The only basis
laid for the admission of this document was the testimony of the
plaintiff's employer who identified the document as part of his busi-
ness records. This statement was insufficient since it did not estab-
lish that the certificate was made in the regular course of business.
The need for establishing the prerequistes for the business re-
cords exception is demonstrated in Holt v. Grimes.3 Here the re-
cord on appeal reflected absolutely no testimony as to the mode of
preparation of the records sought to be introduced. Further, the
witness testifying in regard to the records was not a "custodian or
other qualified witness" as required by section 92.36. The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, held that the lower court commit-
311. FLA. STAT. § 92.36(2) (1973) states:
A record of an act, condition or event, including a record kept by means of
electronic data processing, shall, insofar as relevant, be competent evidence if the
custodian or other qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its
preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near the
time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources
of information, method and time of preparation were such as to justify its admis-
sion.
312. 269 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
313. 261 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
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ted no error in sustaining the objections to admission and directing
a verdict.
However, despite the statutory requirements, including timeli-
ness, the District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Federated
Department Stores, Inc. v. Antigo Industries, Inc.,3" held that a
statement of account was admissible as a business record in an
action to recover on an account stated, even though the statement
was made 9 months after the first transaction between the parties.
The court indicated that irrespective of the time involved, sufficient
business regularity was established by the testimony of the plain-
tiff's president who claimed that the statement was one of several
monthly statements sent to the defendant during the period of their
transactions.
A recent development in the area of business records has been
the use of computer print-outs. Foundation requisites here do not
differ from those required for other business records. However, due
to the complex nature of the computer and the lay jury's unfamiliar-
ity with computer operation, certain special problems may arise.
Thus, the court must make certain that the foundation is sufficient
to warrant a finding of reliability, and that the opposing party have
an opportunity to verify the process by which the information is
programmed into the computer.315
Another potential problem in the computer area is the defini-
tion of "in the regular course of business," since it is possible that
a print-out offered into evidence has been obtained from a computer
program specifically designed for use in litigation. Thus, the courts
will be forced to closely examine the manner in which print-outs are
prepared."I
A recent Florida case involving computer print-outs, Pickrell v.
State,"7 held that it was error to admit testimony by a police officer
that, in response to his request, the Division of Motor Vehicles had
by teletype identified the owner of a motor vehicle. The court stated
that computer print-outs are admissible as are business records, if
the custodian or other qualified witness is available to testify as to
the manner of preparing the print-outs and the trustworthiness of
314. 297 So. 2d 591 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
315. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 314 at 734.
316. Id.
317. 301 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1974).
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the product. No such verification had been made here; thus, the
admission was held to be error, although harmless.
C. Admissions
1. GENERALLY
Admissions are the words or acts of an opponent offered as
evidence against him."1 8 They are sometimes admitted under the
theory that an admission is usually against interest and therefore
probably true. Perhaps a better explanation is the use of admissions
on a fairness basis rather than on some concept of increased reliabil-
ity. A party can hardly object that he had no opportunity to cross-
examine his own statements or that his statements are untrustwor-
thy. Thus, there is some disagreement as to whether admissions are
an exception to the hearsay rule or are nonhearsay. Most courts,
including Florida's, have adopted the former view"9 whereas the
new Federal Rules of Evidence section 801(D) (2) classify admissions
as nonhearsay.
McKay v. Perry,3 0 a dog-bite case, is an example of the use of
the admissions exception to the hearsay rule. The plaintiff offered
testimony of a third person who spoke with the defendant after the
incident. The testimony showed that the defendant told a third
person that he owned a dog similar to the one described by the
plaintiff. The trial court held the testimony inadmissible as hear-
say. However, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held
that the testimony was an admission and could be placed into evi-
dence as proof of ownership of the dog.
Admissions are often confused with another hearsay
exception-declarations against interest-and are, at times, called
"admissions against interest." There are several distinctions be-
tween the two.3"' This confusion in terms can be seen throughout the
decisions. One particularly striking example is Trad v. City of
Jacksonville.32 This case presented the question of value in a con-
demnation proceeding and at issue was the introduction of a tax
receipt and real estate valuation from the city. The evidence showed
318. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 262 at 628.
319. Id. at 629. See section X1, F, infra.
320. 286 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
321. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 262 at 630. See section XII, E, infra.
322. 279 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
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the property was assessed at almost twice the amount offered by the
condemning authority. The court held that the tax receipt and val-
uation were admissions against interest. However, the court then
noted that evidence of assessment of valuation has been held admis-
sible in other courts as declarations against interests. The court
apparently treated the two terms as interchangeable.
2. PLEADINGS
The case of Harrold v. Schluep32 3 involved the question of in-
admissibility of statements made in an opponent's pleadings. In a
suit based on an automobile accident, the defendant's attorney read
excerpts of the plaintiff's complaint to the jury during closing argu-
ment for the purpose of impeaching a witness to the accident. The
Harrold court felt that such use of pleadings is improper unless
the pleading is first introduced into evidence. This appears to be a
proper statement of Florida law. However, the court, in dicta,
stated that "[pileadings are not admissible in evidence to prove or
disapprove a fact in issue. '34 This statement is troublesome in two
respects. First, in Harrold, the defendant's attorney was using the
pleading not to prove or disprove a fact in issue, but to impeach a
witness.
Second, and more significantly, the court's statement of law
appears to be a misapplication of the rule stated in Hines v. Trager
Constr. Co.325 Hines was a situation involving alternative pleading.
Although pleadings are generally admissible against the pleader,26
the Hines court stated that when the pleading sought to be used is
in the alternative and therefore by its nature tentative, an adverse
party may not introduce such pleading into evidence claiming that
it is an admission. Permitting such use would discourage the recog-
nized practice of pleading in the alternative. The Harrold court
applied the Hines rule, denying admissibility, in a case not involv-
ing alternative pleadings.
The Harrold court further confused the law by attempting to
distinguish Davidson v. Eddings37 which held that pleadings of a
party in a prior lawsuit are admissible as evidence against him in a
323. 264 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1972).
324. Id. at 435.
325. 188 So. 2d 826 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1966).
326. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 265 n.46.
327. 262 So. 2d 232 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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subsequent case. The Harrold court viewed as crucial the fact that
in Davidson the pleading sought to be intduced was from a former
lawsuit. No reason is offered by the Harrold court why previous
pleadings are any worthier than pleadings in the same case. It would
appear the only proper distinction lies between tentative alternative
pleadings, and final, non-alternative pleadings28
3. SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS
The courts, when dealing with admissions made in the course
of settlement efforts, are faced with two conflicting policies. As men-
tioned earlier, 2 ' admissions are usually allowed based on a fairness
policy. However, another goal which the courts strive for is the
encouragement of settlements. A policy which would allow the ad-
mission of statements made in the course of a settlement discussion,
against the declarer would do little to foster settlements. As such,
it has generally been held that admissions made as part of settle-
ment offers are not admissible. In Hill v. City of Daytona Beach,330
the court held that in a condemnation action it was error to admit
into evidence, either for impeachment purposes or as evidence of the
value of the land, an unexecuted written settlement agreement be-
tween the condemnee and the condemnor city. The city wished to
introduce the agreement to establish the value of the land. The
owner was asking for more than three times the amount shown on
the agreement. The court said, "it has long been the law of this state
that an offer to settle or compromise a claim or dispute between
parties is not admissible as an admission against the party making
the offer as to the amount of liability. '331
4. VICARIOUS ADMISSIONS
Generally, when a party to a suit has expressly authorized an-
other person to speak for him, the statements of that person are
allowed as admissions. However, when there is no express authoriza-
tion to speak, the tendency has been to admit the agent's state-
ments as admissions only when made in relation to the scope of the
agent's duty. This position has created problems regarding admis-
328. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 265 n.55.
329. See text accompanying note 319 supra.
330. 288 So. 2d 306 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
331. Id. at 308.
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sion statements made by an employee after an accident. Such state-
ments, it has been argued, are not within the scope of the em-
ployee's duties.
In Lan-Chile Airlines, Inc. v. Rodriguez,33 a suit against a for-
eign airline, plaintiffs were beaten while at an airport. Testimony
by the assailants at trial indicated that they were hired by agents
of the airline to attack the plaintiffs in order to discourage their
labor union activities. The court held that the trial judge had made
a finding that a prima facie case of agency had-been proven, prior
to permitting the testimony, and thus no error was committed. "The
fact of agency may be demonstrated by inference from facts and
circumstances and the concept of the parties involved in a particu-
lar case. 333
In Seaboard Coast Line Railroad v. Nieuwendaal,34 the facts
indicated that before sunrise a collision had occurred between the
plaintiff's automobile and the defendant's train. The issue was
whether the train had been engaged in a switching operation at the
time of the accident. If it had been, the railroad had violated a
Florida statute35 which required visual warnings under these cir-
cumstances. No dispute as to the absence of visual warnings existed.
The conductor had told an investigating officer shortly after the
accident that the train had been engaged in a switching operation.
The court held that the conductor's statement was admissible as an
admission although the conductor took the stand and denied mak-
ing the statement. "It is well settled that an admission against
interest may be introduced into evidence as substantive evidence of
the truth of the matter stated. This is so even though the person
making the admission against interest subsequently denies making
such admission., 33 The court never addressed itself to the question
of whether the statement was made within the scope of employ-
ment.
5. SILENCE
If a statement is made by another person in the presence of a
party to the action, containing assertions of facts which, if untrue,
332. 296 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
333. Id. at 500, citing 29 AM. JUR. 2d Evidence § 663 (1965).
334. 253 So. 2d 451 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1971).
335. FLA. STAT § 357.08 (1973).
336. 253 So. 2d at 452.
19761
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the party would naturally be expected to deny, his failure to speak
may be used against him as an admission.337
The District Court of Appeal, First District, in Daugherty v.
State, 3 8 ruled that it was error, although harmless, to admit a by-
stander's testimony that before a robbery one of the participants
said to him, in the defendant's presence, "[w]e are going to hit the
store so you better get out." The court declared that as to the defen-
dant this was not an admission by silence, and cautioned against
misconceptions concerning use of hearsay testimony on the ground
that the defendant was present at the time the statement was made.
The court said, "[t]he otherwise hearsay statement can only be
admitted when it can be shown that in the context in which the
statement was made, it was so accusatory in character that the
defendant's silence may be inferred to have been assent to its
truth. ' '3 1 The admission by silence exception was found not applica-
ble in this case because the statement made to a third person was
not sufficiently accusatory regarding the defendant.
D. Res Gestae
The term res gestae is sued to describe statements which are
made in connection with litigated facts in order to fully illuminate
the witness' testimony. It has been used not only to admit hearsay,
but to admit declarations that in many cases were never hearsay,
such as "verbal acts13 or statements being used for circumstantial
proof.341
The phrase has been much criticized for its vagueness and im-
precision. It appears that most jurisdictions, although not Florida,
have now abandoned its use since declarations which are res gestae
and are hearsay usually fall under one of the following specific ex-
ceptions: declarations of present bodily conditions, declarations of
present state of mind, excited utterances, and declarations of pres-
ent sense impression. 342 Nonetheless, despite the criticism and the
lack of precision, the Florida courts persist in the use of this out-
moded term.
337. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 270 at 651-52.
338. 269 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
339. Id. at 427.
340. See MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 249 at 589.
341. See Id. § 289 at 687.
342. Id. § 288 at 686.
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In Elmore v. State,"' the defendant and the deceased became
involved in a fight which resulted in a fatal shooting. Within sec-
onds of the shooting, a bystander appeared on the scene with a
shotgun and said to the defendant, "[i]f you had given out I was
going to help you." The District Court of Appeal, Fourth District,
held that the trial court erred in not admitting this statement into
evidence, as part of the res gestae, to substantiate a claim of self-
defense. The court outlined four points necessary for a statement by
a third party to become part of the res gestae: (1) the statement
must be spontaneous; (2) the statement must have been made by
one who witnessed the subject act; (3) the statement must be made
at the scene of the act; and (4) the statement must be relevant.
Another example of res gestae can be found in Appell v. State. "
Here, the defendant's revolver discharged while he was returning it
to the victim. The lower court conviction was reversed when res
gestae statements showing an accidental shooting were held admis-
sible. The facts indicated that approximately 2 hours after the
shooting, the victim's mother saw him in the hospital. The victim
had not been interviewed before this time and no outside influence
had been exerted on him. The victim made statements to his mother
which would have exculpated the defendant. The lower court held
these statements inadmissible. The District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, reversed, holding that the res gestae exception to
the hearsay rule applied. The court found several factors which had
to be examined in order to determine "sponteneity": (1) the time
gap between the statement and the accident; (2) the voluntary na-
ture of the declaration; (3) the self-serving nature of the statement;
and (4) the declarant's physical and mental condition at the time
of the statement. It is submitted that rather than attempt to define
and apply res gestae, the court might have admitted the statement
as a declaration of present mental state or as a declaration against
interest, since the statement would have damaged the victim's posi-
tion if a later civil suit developed.
Court confusion of res gestae with other hearsay is not unusual.
In Daugherty v. State34 the trial court characterized a statement as
part of the res gestae while on appeal it was analyzed as an admis-
343. 291 So. 2d 617 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974).
344. 250 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1971).
345. 269 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
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sion. In Lawrence v. State,3"1 a second degree murder case, the
prosecution sought to introduce testimony concerning a multiparty
conversation in which the defendant and the victim took part and
which occurred immediately prior to the shooting of the victim. The
State contended the conversation was admissible as an admission
since it took place in the presence of the defendant. The defendant
urged that this "in the presence of the defendant" doctrine of ad-
missibility had been abolished in Daughtery v. State317 and that
only by showing a defendant's silence in the face of accusatory con-
versation sufficient to be deemed an admission, could such conver-
sation be admissible. The court, however, chose not to come to grips
with the arguments of the parties but rather allowed the
conversation since it fell within the overall res gestae. Given the
court's inclination to allow the testimony, it might have done so
based on the recognized "excited utterance" exception 348 to the
hearsay rule so as to avoid the confusion involved with the use of
res gestae.
E. Declarations Against Interest
In order to satisfy this exception to the hearsay rule in its tradi-
tional form, two requirements must be met. First, the declaration
must contain facts which are against the pecuniary or proprietary
interests of the declarant. Second, the declarant must be presently
unavailable. Declarations against interest should be distinguished
from admissions.3 49
Traditionally, statements against penal interests have not been
admissible as a hearsay exception.350 However, there is a recent
trend away from this position. For example, the Federal Rules of
Evidence allow an exception for statements against penal interest.3 15
If the declaration against interest exception is based on the rationale
that one does not make untrue statements against his own financial
or proprietary interest, surely the rejection of declarations against
penal interests cannot be justified.
Notwithstanding this trend and logic, Florida still fails to rec-
346. 294 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
347. 269 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972).
348. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 297.
349. See Section XII, C supra.
350. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 273 at 673.
351. FED. R. EvID. § 804(B)(3).
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ognize declarations against penal interest as hearsay exceptions. In
Francis v. State352 it was stated in dicta:
Although some jurisdictions and the proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence recognize declarations against penal interest as an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule, appellant has been unable to point
to any definitive opinion from either the Florida Supreme Court
or any of the District Courts of Appeal which recognize the decla-
ration against penal interest doctrine, nor has our independent
research revealed any. We therefore find that the declaration
against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule is not recog-
nized under Florida law.353
Florida's refusal to recognize declarations against penal interest
as hearsay exceptions was again manifested in Pitts v. State.35" '
There the defendants were charged with murder. They sought to
admit a confession to the crime by an uncharged third person who
refused to testify at the trial on fifth amendment grounds."5 Al-
though clearly hearsay, the defendants sought to allow the confes-
sion's introduction as a declaration against penal interest. The court
clearly held that no such exception is recognized in Florida. In addi-
tion, it suggested that even if such an exception existed, its availa-
bility would depend upon other corroborative indicia of reliability
being present.
The Pitts court justified its refusal to recognize the "against
penal interest" exception by hypothesizing that a defendant could
be acquitted by offering the confession of an uncharged third party,
and upon subsequent trial of that third party, he could introduce a
confession of the first defendant, who would not be subject to double
jeopardy. This logic neglects three important considerations: (1) the
original defendant will not always have made a confession which the
third party can later use; (2) use of an original defendant's hearsay
confession in a second trial would be predicated on the original
defendant's unavailability, and since he would be protected from a
second prosecution, refusal to testify on fifth amendment grounds
would not constitute such unavailability; and (3) the court's logic
352. 308 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
353. Id. at 176.
354. 307 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975).
355. The court discussed the question of whether refusal to testify constituted sufficient
"unavailability" within the "against interest" exception, but left the question open.
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assumes that confronted with two confessions to the same crime, the
second jury would believe the prior defendant's confession.
F. Acts and Declarations of Co-Conspirators
The co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule has been
stated to hold that any act or declaration by one co-conspirator
committed (1) during the existence of a conspiracy and (2) in fur-
therance thereof is admissible against each and every co-conspirator
provided that a foundation of independent proof is first laid estab-
lishing the conspiracy."' There have been several theories to support
this exception. The traditional reason is the agency rationale that
co-conspirators are co-agents and thus are held responsible for each
other's acts and declarations. 57 Another theory is that co-
conspirator declarations are unusually trustworthy, like declara-
tions against interest, and therefore are hearsay exceptions.358 One
author35 contends that neither of these rationales are impressive
and the admission of the hearsay is based on policy. There is such
a high probative need for the testimony, that co-conspirator decla-
rations are admitted out of necessity.
In Parker v. State,3"' and its companion case, Hudson v.
State,3"' the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, held that
extrajudicial declarations of one co-conspirator made outside the
presence of another co-conspirator may be admitted where the dec-
laration was made in furtherance and during the existence of the
conspiracy. The court emphasized that before the declaration may
be admitted, the defendant's participation must first be established
by other non-hearsay evidence.
The co-conspirator rule requiring that there first be indepen-
dent evidence of the existence of a conspiracy prior to the use of
hearsay, was followed in Honchell v. State.36 However, a footnote
to the case indicates that it is possible for the order of proof to be
reversed:
356. Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MICH L. REv. 1159, 1161 (1954).
357. Id. at 1163, citing Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961 (2d Cir. 1926).
358. Id., citing 4 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1080a (3d ed. 1940).
359. Id. at 1166.
360. 276 So. 2d 98 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
361. 276 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
362. 257 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1971).
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While the existence of conspiracy and the connection of the de-
fendant therewith normally must precede the introduction of evi-
dence of acts and declarations of the other parties thereto, the
trial judge in his discretion may permit the order of proof to be
reversed, admitting evidence of the acts and declarations of the
co-conspirators before proof is given of the conspiracy itself. How-
ever, this is conditional on the prosecutor subsequently furnish-
ing adequate proof of the conspiracy itself."'
In Resnick v. State"4 the court, after reiterating the co-
conspirator rule emphasized that it was not necessary that the con-
spiracy be proven only by direct evidence, but rather it may also be
shown by circumstantial evidence.
G. Prior Recorded Testimony
Recorded testimony in prior hearings is held to be a hearsay
exception because the parties have had the same opportunity to
cross-examine. The only procedural safeguard missing is jury obser-
vation. Generally, there are three requirements for the prior re-
corded testimony exception: (1) the witness must be unavailable;
(2) the witness must have been under oath at the time the statement
was made; and (3) there must have been a reasonable opportunity
to cross-examine the witness.3 5
In Alford v. State,36 the Supreme Court of Florida clearly laid
out the factors to be considered in determining the admissibility of
prior testimony. The defendant had been convicted of rape and
murder. A witness who testified at the preliminary hearing identi-
fied the killer's car and hat at the scene. Prior to trial the witness
left the state and refused to return and testify at trial. The trial
court admitted the testimony from the preliminary hearing and the
admission was upheld on appeal where: (1) the state tried in good
faith to produce the witness and his absence was not caused or
contrived by the state; (2) counsel for the defendant appeared and
cross-examined the witness at the preliminary hearing; (3) the testi-
mony was previewed outside the presence of the jury; and (4) similar
supportive testimony to that of the absent witness was given by two
363. Id. at 890 n.1. This case was cited, but not followed in Parker v. State, 276 So. 2d
98, 100 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973).
364. 287 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1974).
365. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, § 255 at 616.
366. 307 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1975).
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other witnesses at the trial. The court noted that no attempt had
been made to get the witness' deposition, but concluded that the
testimony at the preliminary hearing was more reliable than a depo-
sition.
Apparently, the most critical factor in the use of the prior testi-
mony exception is whether the defendant had an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness. In James v. State,367 a witness who testi-
fied at the preliminary hearing died prior to trial. The testimony
was the only direct evidence implicating the defendant. The trial
court admitted the testimony. On appeal, the court discussed the
defendant's arguments as to the difference between a preliminary
hearing and a trial, noting that: (1) the preliminary hearing must
be held without undue delay, thus there is little opportunity to
prepare; and (2) since the only issue is probable cause at a prelimi-
nary hearing, the defense may not deem it wise to disclose its de-
fense or its evidence. However, the court dismissed these arguments
as a basis for concluding that the right of confrontation is not
satisfied at a preliminary hearing. In State v. Barnes,368 the trial
court admitted statements of a witness made before an official court
reporter. The witness had died prior to trial. The statement was
taken by the defendant's counsel in question and answer form, but
without notice to the State and the State had no oppportunity to
cross-examine. The court held that since the State is not accorded
the same right or confrontation in a criminal prosecution that is
allowed the defendant, and since the judge could instruct the jury
as to the weight of the evidence and the State could still impeach
the witness' statement, the statement should be admissible.
However, it seems that in this situation, unlike other hearsay excep-
tions, there is no substantial indicia of reliability apart from the fact
that the statement was made under oath. The seven paragraph
opinion is not persuasive.
H. Probation Hearings
A revocation of probation hearing is informal and does not take
the course of a regular trial. Its purpose is to satisfy the conscience
of the court as to whether conditions of a suspended sentence have
been violated and to give the accused an opportunity to be heard." 9
367. 254 So. 2d 838 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1971).
368. 280 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1973).
369. Broil v. State, 32 So. 2d 607, 609 (Fla. 1947).
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As a result of this relatively relaxed procedural framework, a ques-
tion has arisen as to the use of hearsay evidence at probation revoca-
tion hearings.
The District Court of Appeal, Third District, in Hampton v.
State,37° held that probation could not be revoked solely upon hear-
say evidence. It also indicated in dictum, somewhat ambiguously,
that revocation proceedings "are not rendered erroneous by the
admission of hearsay testimony. . . ."I This decision left open the
question of whether any hearsay evidence is properly admissible.
This question was seemingly answered in the affirmative by the
Third District in Randolph v. State"'2 wherein it was stated that
hearsay testimony which "would have been inadmissable at trial
[was] properly . . . considered in the instant case. . .. ,,373
However, the District Court of Appeal, First District, in White
v. State,374 considered after Hampton and Randolph, stated that
''we are acquainted with no case holding that hearsay testimony is
properly admissible in [probation revocation] proceedings. It is
not. "375
Thus there is agreement that probation cannot be revoked
solely upon hearsay evidence, but disagreement as to whether hear-
say is admissible at all. Given the increased recognition afforded
probation revocation hearings by the United States Supreme Court
in Mempha v. Rhay376 it would appear the First District's position
is the better view.
370. 276 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1973).
371. Id. at 497.
372. 292 So. 2d 374 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974).
373. Id. at 375.
374. 301 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1974).
375. Id. at 465.
376. 389 U.S. 128 (1967). The court held that an indigent defendant had a right to the
assistance of appointed counsel at a probation revocation hearing. The probation revocation
hearing was found to be a critical stage of a criminal prosecution where substantial rights of
the accused may be affected.
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